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T HE United States Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin' and subsequent judicial and administrative
decisions have given the Natural Gas Act wide application. The
effect of these decisions has been to bring virtually every independent
producer and gatherer' of natural gas who engages in an interstate
transportaion or a jurisdictional sale of natural gas within the act's
definition of a natural gas company, thus subjecting these producers
and gatherers to federal regulation. This Article will present the
statutory provisions, presently effective rules and regulations, and
judicial and administrative decisions which have effected the regula-
tory position of independent producers and gatherers of natural gas.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT
At an early date the states regulated two important segments of
the natural gas industry; state regulation of natural gas production
was necessary as a conservation measure, and state regulation of
local distribution of natural gas was essential because of the monopo-
listic nature of the business.
Since the states possess the power to regulate the price charged
the consuming public for gas, it would appear that the states could
effectively protect the ultimate consumer. When determining the
lawfulness of rates charged by the distributing companies, however,
the distributing companies must be allowed the cost of purchased
gas as an operating expense; failure to allow this expense item would
constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property. For effective
rate regulation it is therefore necessary to control the wholesale
price of natural gas; hindering state control of wholesale prices is
the fact that most of the natural gas distributed in the larger con-
suming states is produced in other states and imported into the
consumer states.
Prior to 1935, powerful holding companies developed integrated
gas systems which produced or purchased natural gas in the field,
transported gas from the field to the consuming areas, and sold gas
to the ultimate consumer or distributing companies. Subsidiary
companies were established to hinder effective state regulation. In
many instances it was impossible for state agencies to ascertain the ac-
tual cost of gas incurred by the local distributing companies and other
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information needed to regulate effectively the price paid by the
ultimate consumer. Consequently, the states attempted to regulate
the sales by the interstate transmission companies to the distrib-
uting companies, but the states failed before the United States
Supreme Court when the validity of state regulation of whole-
sale rates was tested.3 The Supreme Court held that the inter-
state transportation of natural gas and the sale of natural gas
produced in one state to a distributing company in another state
constituted interstate commerce. The interstate commerce clause
of the United States Constitution is a limitation upon the author-
ity of the several states, and state action which operates as a di-
rect burden upon, or obstruction to, interstate commerce is un-
lawful even in the absence of federal regulation over the subject
matter.' The decisions do permit, however, state regulation of
"burner tip" or direct sales to the consumer even in those instances
where the sales are made by an interstate transmission company.
The effectiveness of state regulation was therefore limited to those
instances where the source and ultimate consumption of natural gas
were confined to a single state and where an interstate transmission
company sold gas directly to the ultimate consumer.
Due to the inability of state agencies to control prices demanded
by interstate transmission companies, there was an appeal for con-
gressional action. A Senate resolution ordered the Federal Trade
Commission to initiate an investigation of the natural gas industry.!
After finding that the practices of the industry tended to result in
excessively high cost to the consumer and that the independent pro-
ducers and consumers were in a precarious position due to the in-
fluence exerted by the transmission companies, the resulting report
advocated the extension of federal power to remedy the situation.!
During the following session of Congress, the Natural Gas Act ' was
passed without opposition.
The Natural Gas Act declares that the natural gas industry is
'State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934); Missouri v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924). See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Attleboro
Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
553 (1923); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920); Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
221 U.S. 229 (1911).
'Wabash, S.L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
'S. Res. No. 83, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 Cong. Rec. 3054 (1928).
S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A (1936).
'Act of June 21, 1938, c. 556, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717.-717w.
(1938) (hereinafter cited as 15 U.S.C.A. § 717.-717w.).
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affected with the public interest and that federal regulation is nec-
essary in the public interest
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended federal reg-
ulation to be confined to the interstate transportation of natural gas
and those sales which the Supreme Court declared the states did not
have the power to regulate Federal regulation was to complement
the power of the states and produce a harmonious and comprehensive
system of regulation; neither state nor federal regulatory bodies
were to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other, and it was not
the intention or purpose of Congress to usurp the authority of the
state regulatory commissions. ° The Federal Power Commission was
charged with the administration of the act and was given the nec-
essary administrative power to enforce the act, including the power
to prescribe rules and regulations."
II. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
A. Statutory Provisions
The principal point of controversy arising under the Natural Gas
Act concerns the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission.
Section 1 (b) of the act provides:
The provisions of this act shall apply to the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural
gas for resale for ultimate public consumption, for domestic, commer-
cial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged
in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other trans-
portation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural
gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production
or gathering of natural gas."'
Section 7 of the act prescribes the method by which the commission
is to assert its jurisdiction. Section 7 (c) provides:
No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas com-
pany upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall
15 U.S.C.A. § 717.(a) (1948).
H.R. Rep. No. 2651, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 84-A (1936); H.R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). See H.R. Rep.
No. 2192, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933); H.R. Rep. No. 827, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1935);
Comment, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 Geo. L.J. 695 (1956).
I'FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950); FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947);
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n 332 U.S. 507 (1947); FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943); Lightfoot v. City of Springfield, 361 Mo. 659, 236 S.W.2d 348
(1951).
'" 15 U.S.C.A. 5 717o. (1948).
12 15 U.S.C.A. § 717.(b) (1948).
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engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the juris-
diction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension
of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or
extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-
gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by
the Commission authorizing such acts or operations ...."
Applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity
must be in writing and verified under oath, and the commission must
set the matter for hearing and give notice to interested parties. 4 In a
certificate proceeding the burden of proof is on the applicant, and
section 7(e) of the act provides that a certificate shall be issued to
any qualified applicant, authorizing the whole or any part of the sale
or service ". . . if it is found that the applicant is able and willing
properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed and to
conform to the provisions of the Act and the requirements, rules,
and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the pro-
posed service, sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisition,
to the extent authorized by the certificate, is or will be required
by the present or future public convenience and necessity. . .. " In
the absence of the statutory showing, the application must be denied.
When the commission has granted a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity and the applicant accepts the certificate or com-
mences deliveries thereunder, the natural gas company may not term-
inate or abandon the sale or service involved merely because it has the
contractual right to take such action. Section 7(b) of the act pro-
hibits the abandonment of jurisdictional facilities or any service
rendered by means of these facilities without the permission of the
commission granted at the conclusion of an appropriate hearing.'"
A literal interpretation of section 1 (b) would indicate that the
Federal Power Commission was granted jurisdiction over: (1) the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) the sale
of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural
gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale. The commission
was expressly denied the authority to regulate: (1) any other trans-
portation or sale of natural gas; (2) the local distribution of natural
gas; (3) the facilities used for local distribution; and (4) the
production and gathering of natural gas. The decisions have held
13 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f.(C) (1948).
14 See Northeastern Gas Transp. Co. v. FPC, 195 F.2d 872 (3rd Cir. 1952).
'5 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f.(e) (1948).
e is U.S.C.A. 5 717f.(b) (1948).
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that these exemptions should be strictly construed as a restriction
upon the primary grant of authority."
It should be noted that the act does not define "production or gath-
ering" or "local distribution," but that interstate commerce is defined
as "commerce between any point in a State and any point outside
thereof, or between points within the same State but through any
place outside thereof, but only insofar as such commerce takes place
within the United States."'" Judicial interpretation of the act in-
dicates that this definition of "interstate commerce" is coextensive
with the Supreme Court's definition of the term."
Soon after the statute was enacted, various tests, based upon such
factors as the point of sale and the gas pressures maintained at a par-
ticular point, were developed to determine when the product went
from intrastate commerce into interstate commerce and back again
to intrastate commerce." These mechanical considerations, however,
are no longer controlling to determine for regulatory purposes the
interstate or intrastate character of the sale or service." The "con-
tinuous flow" doctrine is now the test; thus natural gas is in inter-
state commerce when it is produced in a continuous flow and destined
for, and committed to, interstate transportation or sale from the
moment of its production.2 Therefore, purely mechanical conditions,
as variations in pipeline pressure, are not the criteria of federal and
state regulatory powers.
As previously stated, Congress intended to exercise federal reg-
ulation only in those areas which the states were denied the power
to regulate. Only the interstate transportation of natural gas, the
interstate sale of natural gas for resale, and "natural-gas companies"
were to be subject to the jurisdiction of the commission; federal
control was not to be exclusive but concurrent with state regulation.
Thus, state control of natural gas companies engaged in interstate
operations was not precluded by the act where the company's opera-
" Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 10; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. Public Service Comm'n, supra note 10; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S.
635 (1945); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., supra note 10; FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942);
J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 550 (3rd Cir. 1956).
i 15 U.S.C.A. S 717a.(7) (1948).19 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 10.
' See the discussion and cases cited in Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public
Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 at 504-05 (1942).
' Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 10; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. Public Service Comm'n, supra note 10; Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S.
626 (1945); Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., supra note 20.
"See the discussion of the Deep South case at pp. 438-39 infra.
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tions were not exclusively interstate. 3 Regulation of production,
gathering, and local distribution was to be exclusively a state func-
tion, but this was soon changed by the decisions without regard
to the express provisions of section 1 (b) of the act."
B. The Production And Gathering Exemption
1. Prior to June 7, 1954
Section 1 (b) of the act expressly provides that the provisions of
the act shall not apply to the production or gathering of natural gas."
To understand more fully the Phillips case and the extension of fed-
eral regulation to independent producers and gatherers of natural
gas despite this statutory provision, a review of several cases involving
the production and producing properties of interstate transmission
companies is appropriate.
In FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.," the Supreme Court upheld a
decision of the commission which extended the scope of its regulation
to include the production and producing properties of an inter-
state transmission company. The company was not allowed, as an
expense, the fair field value of gas which it produced and delivered
into its system, but the company's investment in producing prop-
erties was included in its overall investment or rate base for a return
which was determined by the traditional method employed to reg-
ulate the transportation business. Hope did not object to the use of
the rate base method or the inclusion of producing properties in the
rate lease but as its principal argument protested the method of
ascertaining the rate base. The validity of the commission's policy
'3 See Central States Elec. Co. v. City of Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138 (1945); Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 635, 194 S.W.2d 476 (1946).
2 For example, in FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950), federal regulation
was extended to a wholly intrastate natural gas company. The company received natural gas
in the state of Ohio from interstate transmission companies and transported the gas through
high pressure pipelines for delivery to local distributing companies. The Court had previously
held that interstate transmission ends when the gas enters the distribution system of the local
utilities; the Court employed this principle to conclude that the wholly intrastate movement
in the high pressure pipelines constituted both interstate transportation and commerce, and
the intrastate company was a "natural gas company" within the purview of the act. Wholly
intrastate companies, however, were freed from federal control by further congressional ac-
tion. Act of March 27, 1954 (Hinshaw Amendment), c. 115, 68 Stat. 36, 15 U.S.C.A.
717.(c). The amendment removes from the application of the act a company that receives
natural gas produced out of state, at the state line, or within the consumer state and confines
its operations to sales or services within the consumer state. The East Ohio Gas Co. case
brought about needless duplication of federal and state regulation and increased the regula-
tory expenses of companies which were required to comply with the orders of state and
federal agencies. The commission favored the amendment, pointing to the fact there is no
need for federal regulation in addition to that provided by state law where only one state is
affected. 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News, pp. 2101-05.
25 15 U.S.C.A. S 717b. (1948).
26320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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was questioned in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC," and the
essence of the Supreme Court's majority opinion upholding the com-
mission's decision is as follows:
No exclusion of property used or useful in production of natural gas
was made by the Act. That type of property was not singled out for
special treatment; it was treated the same as all other property. We
must read § 1 (b) in the context of the whole Act. It must be re-
conciled with the explicit provisions which describe the normal conven-
tions of rate-making .... Since there is no provision in the Act which
would require the Commission to value the gas at the price urged by
Canadian, the problem on review would be whether the end result was
unjust and unreasonable. . . . These considerations lead us to conclude
that § 1 (b) does not prevent the Commission from taking into ac-
count the production properties and gathering facilities of natural gas
companies when it fixes their rates."8
The Court was not unanimous in this decision. Chief Justice Stone
and Justices Roberts, Reed, and Frankfurter dissented, stating that
the commission exceeded its authority under the statute. The dissent
emphasized the clarity of section 1 (b) in including transportation
and sale for resale and exempting production and gathering." The
dissenters denied the commission the power to integrate the pro-
ducing properties in the rate base or apply the standards of valuation
and rate of return which are applicable to the regulated business;
the legislative history of the act was reviewed to discredit the ma-
jority opinion which condoned the commission's order under the
authority of a rate provision of the act."
Federal power over producing properties was limited by FPC v.
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co." Panhandle Eastern planned to
transfer leases covering 97,000 acres of land plus working capital to a
newly formed company; the new company was to deliver all of its
stock to Panhandle Eastern for distribution to Panhandle Eastern's
stockholders. Attempting to prevent the transfer, the commission
contended that the leases had been dedicated to the production of
natural gas which was to be used in the performance of Panhandle
Eastern's public utility obligations, and the leases could not be re-
linquished without the consent of the commission. The Court rejected
the commission's arguments as inviting expansion of federal power
"324 U.S. 581 (1945).
28 Id. at 602-04. See also Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, supra note 17; State
Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953); Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC,
155 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1946).
2324 U.S. at 618.
MId. at 619-22.
B2337 U.S. 498 (1949).
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into a forbidden area. Thus, the commission failed in its attempt to
control effectively physical properties used in the production of nat-
ural gas which are committed to the service requirements of the trans-
mission company and included in its rate base. This decision made it
possible for interstate transmission companies to liquidate their pro-
duction holdings rather than to maintain these properties for the re-
turn allowed by the commission.
The decision rendered in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC,'3
which extended the commission's jurisdiction to the producing
properties of interstate transmission companies applied only in those
instances where the transmission company produced, transported,
and sold the production from its own wells in interstate commerce
for resale. The production and gathering exemption was regarded
as precluding federal regulation of the rates charged where a trans-
mission company purchased gas from an independent producer or
sold gas to another transmission company, provided that the trans-
action involved was at "arm's length." These unregulated field
prices were governed by gas purchase contracts, some of which had
been consummated many years prior to the enactment of the
Natural Gas Act. If the transaction was not at arm's length, as, e.g.,
in the case of sales to an affiliate, the commission could investigate
the reasonableness of the price paid by the purchasing company.
However, this situation was changed by two important cases. The
Phillips case extended the commission's jurisdiction to sales from a
producer to an interstate transmission company, and Interstate Nat-
ural Gas Co. v. FPC extended the commission's jurisdiction to sales
by an interstate transmission company to another transmission com-
pany.
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC' was the first decision to sus-
tain federal regulation of natural gas sales conducted at arm's length
in the gas field. Interstate owned a pipeline extending from nothern
Louisiana into Mississippi and back into Louisiana, where the gas was
sold; Interstate admitted it was a natural gas company within the
meaning of the act and that this portion of its business was subject
to regulation by the commission. In addition to these facilities, Inter-
state owned producing properties in a field near Monroe, Louisiana,
at which point the above described pipeline originated. Some of
Interstate's production and gas purchased from other producers in
the field was transmitted through Interstate's pipeline and sold to
S2 Supra note 27.




distributing companies. A large portion of the production, however,
was sold to three pipeline companies after gathering; each purchaser
transported natural gas to states other than Louisiana for resale. Inter-
state was an affiliate of one purchaser, but the sales to the other two
purchasers were apparently at arm's length. The price paid by all
three purchasers was standard for the field. The unique feature of
the case was the fact that Interstate had previously avoided reg-
ulation by the State of Louisiana due to its interstate character.
Resisting federal regulation, Interstate contended that the sales
of its production to the pipeline purchasers were not interstate sales
nor subject to federal control due to the production and gathering
exemption of section 1 (b) of the act. The Court promptly dis-
pensed with the first contention by employing the statutory defini-
tion of "interstate commerce" and the "continuous flow" theory.
As to the second contention, the Court found the production and
gathering process had been completed at the time the sales were
consumated and that the regulation of these sales was predominately
a national rather than a local problem. Interstate sales made during
the course of production and gathering were held to be non-jurisdic-
tional provided that such sales were closely connected with the local
incidents of that process and that regulation by the commission was
inconsistent, or substantially interfered, with the exercise of state
regulatory functions.
Three important conclusions can be drawn or inferred from the
Court's opinion: (1) a sale of natural gas in the field which is des-
tined to a continuous interstate flow is a sale in interstate commerce;
(2) the contractual relationship between the parties apparently is
immaterial; and (3) so long as the federal regulation does not sub-
stantially interfere with state regulation it may encompass sales to a
transmission company by an independent producer as well as by
another transmission company. The independent producers were dis-
turbed by the general terminology employed in the Interstate case.
To clarify the situation the Kerr Bill3' was passed by Congress and the
commission issued Order 139; each removed arm's length sales by
independent producers from federal regulation. The Kerr Bill was
vetoed," however, and the commission rescinded Order 139. The re-
scinding order, Order 154, announced the commission's policy against
the investigation of producers and gatherers generally, but stated in-
vestigations would be conducted where the sales materially affected
interstate commerce and the rates appeared excessive.
83H.R. 1758 & S. 1498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
30 96 Cong. Rec. 5304 (1950).
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Prior to the issuance of Order 154 the commission's policy had
continuously been to refrain from exerting its jurisdiction over the
independent producer. This jurisdictional question was first presented
to the commission in the case of In the Matter of Columbian Fuel
Corp." After considering the legislative history, the commission re-
fused to extend federal regulation to the independent producer. The
commission found that it was not consonant with congressional in-
tent to regulate all persons whose only sales in interstate commerce
were made as an incident to, and immediately upon the completion
of, the production and gathering process. In at least seventeen other
instances the commission adhered to this position and refused to
exercise its regulatory powers in such cases."0
Consistent with the policy announced in Order 154, the com-
mission instituted an investigation of Phillips Petroleum Company,
the largest independent producer of natural gas in the nation, to
determine whether Phillips was a natural gas company within the
purview of the act, and, if it was subject to federal regulation,
whether its rates were just and reasonable. After a lengthy investi-
gation and hearing the commission found that the sales under con-
sideration, which were consummated at the tail gates of processing
plants, were non-jurisdictional and terminated the proceeding." The
commission was of the opinion that the decisions of the Supreme
Court precluded federal regulation of incidents connected with, and
actively related to, production and gathering. The commission en-
tered an express finding that regulation by a federal agency would
substantially interfere with the regulatory functions of the state
agencies. Upon review the decision of the commission was reversed
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,"0 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court upheld the reversal of the commission's order
by its decision issued June 7, 1954, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wis-
consin."' The majority opinion not only upheld the decision of the
court of appeals, but also went further. The all-inclusive nature
2 F.P.C. 200 (1940).
Jacobs, Governmental Regulation of Gas Production, Louisiana State Univ. Fourth An-
nual Institute on Mineral Law 43, 45 (1956); Jacobs, Problems Incident to the Marketing
of Gas, Southwestern Legal Foundation Fifth Annual Institute on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 271,
281 (1954).
39 In the Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951).
4°State of Wisconsin v. FPC, 20s F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
41 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See also Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S.
210, 86 A.L.R. 403 (1932), where it was held that production of oil and gas is essentially
a mining operation and, therefore, not a part of interstate commerce even though the product
is immediately shipped in such commerce.
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of the majority's opinion may best be illustrated by the following
exerpts:
• ..we believe that the legislative history indicates a congressional
intent to give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all whole-
sales of natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline com-
pany or not and whether occurring before, during, or after transmission
by an interstate pipeline company4 . . . . We are satisfied that congress
sought to regulate wholesales of natural gas occurring at both ends of
the interstate transmission system". . . . Regulation of the sales in inter-
state commerce for resale made by a so-called independent natural-gas
producer is not essentially different from regulation of such sales when
made by an affiliate of an interstate pipeline company. In both cases,
the rates charged may have a direct and substantial effect on the price
paid by the ultimate consumers. Protection of consumers against ex-
ploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies was the primary aim
of the Natural Gas Act."
When the Court refused to recognize any distinction between an
integrated transmission company and an independent producer, re-
gardless of size, the resulting expansion of federal power was vast.
To negative the express findings of the commission that Phillips'
sales were a part of production and gathering and that federal con-
trol would substantially interfere with state regulation (which are
apparently findings of fact conclusively binding upon the reviewing
court) the majority merely stated that the commission's findings
were "without adequate basis at law" and production and gathering
had been completed before the sales occurred." The majority at-
tempted to justify its position by relying upon the Interstate case,
but it should be noted that the Interstate opinion refused to consider
the principal jurisdictional question raised by the Phillips case. Fur-
ther, the Interstate decision was based in part on the fact that the
states involved did not oppose federal regulation. In the Phillips
case, however, the producing states vigorously protested the lower
court's action, yet the Supreme Court partially repudiated the Inter-
state decision by the following: ". . . the jurisdiction of the Federal
Power Commission was not intended to vary from state to state,
depending upon the degree of state regulation and of state opposition
to federal control."'"
The Phillips case held that the production and gathering exemption
of section 1 (b) does not preclude the regulation of natural gas sales by
4' 347 U.S. at 682.
43 Id. at 694.





independent producers and gatherers. However, the Supreme Court
specifically reaffirmed its prior decisions in the Panhandle Eastern and
Colorado Interstate cases, holding that producing and gathering fa-
cilities are exempt from the commission's jurisdiction by stating that:
In Federal Power Com. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. 337 US 498,
505, 93 L ed 1499, 1505, 69 S Ct 1251, we observed that the "natural
and clear meaning" of the phrase "production or gathering of natural
gas" is that it encompasses "the producing properties and gathering
facilities of a natural-gas company." Similarly, in Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com. 324 US 581, 598, 89 L ed 1206, 1220,
65 S Ct 829, we stated that "transportation and sale do not include
production or gathering," and indicated that the "production or gather-
ing" exemption applies to the physical activities, facilities, and properties
used in the production and gathering of natural gas. Id., 324 US at
602, 603. See also Federal Power Com. v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 320 US
591, 612-615, 88 L ed 333, 350-352, 64 S Ct 281; Peoples Natural
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com. 75 App DC 235, 127 F2d 153; cf.
United States v. Public Utilities Com. 345 US 295, 307-311, 97 L ed
1020, 1033-1035, 73 S Ct 706.
Thus, the express exemption of section 1 (b) of the act was reduced
to an exemption of the physical activities, facilities and properties
used or useful in the production and gathering of natural gas.
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, argued that the majority opinion
was contrary to the intention of Congress and the understanding of
the states and the commission itself. He analyzed the cases which
opened the "gap" which Congress intended to close by the act and
found that these cases had nothing to do with sales to interstate pipe-
lines by wholly independent, unintegrated, and unaffiliated pro-
ducers and gatherers. Mr. Justice Clark's opinion reviewed the act's
legislative history, concluding that Congress only intended in-
tegrated transmission companies to be subject to federal regulation.
The opinion stated that the final report of the Federal Trade Com-
mission on malpractices in the natural gas industry indicated that
the independent producers, as well as consumers, were the victims
of monopolistic practices by the pipelines.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas regarded the Co-
lumbian Fuel Corp. case' and subsequent commission decisions as
correctly interpreting the legislative intent. Reversal of these de-
cisions, he stated, should be initiated by Congress and not by the
Court. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion recognized the far-reaching
effects of the majority opinion upon production, conservation, and
7 Id. at 678.
48 Supra note 37.
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other matters of importance; furthermore, it set forth this writer's
belief that the Court knew little of the problems involved and thus
was incompetent to deal with them.
A critique of the majority opinion may be summarized by the
following statement of former Senator Price Daniel: "Too often
in recent years our highest court reflects the notions of 'policy'
of a majority of its members rather than the findings as to what
the law and the policy was intended by Congress."' It is the au-
thor's belief that the principal question involved in the Phillips
case was a political one and that the Court substituted its "policy"
for the intention of Congress and for the expert opinion of the
agency charged with the administration of the act. This resulted
in a state of chaos from which the industry and the commission
have not recovered during the past five years.
2. Subsequent to June 7, 1954
a. Producer Sales for Resale.- The sales involved in the Phillips
case occurred at the tail gate of the processing plants, and the
Court held that the production and gathering exemption was not
applicable to the sales since the production and gathering process
had been completed at this point. Subsequently, the producers at-
tempted to consummate gas sales at a point that would clearly
bring the sale within the production and gathering exemption of
section 1 (b). However, the more recent decisions have relied upon
the broad language employed in the Phillips opinion to extend the
commission's jurisdiction to the wellhead, and these decisions have
permitted the regulation of sales consummated prior to the com-
pletion of the production or gathering process.
Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC" was the first judicial de-
cision to extend the Phillips decision substantially. Deep South owned
both oil wells and gas wells in the field under consideration. The
gas sales contract provided that title to casinghead gas and gas-well
gas would pass to the purchaser at the outlet side of separators and
dehydrators, respectively. Deep South did not remove the liquid
hydrocarbons, but the purchaser processed Deep South's produc-
tion after it was commingled with other gas purchased in the field.
After processing, the purchaser sold the residue gas to an interstate
transmission company. Thus, the sales in question were consum-
" Address by Hon. Price Daniel, What Happened to the Harris-Fulbright Amendment
to the Natural Gas Act, presented to the Mineral Law Section, American Bar Ass'n, August
28, 1956.
50247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1539 (1957).
[Vol. 13
NATURAL GAS ACT
mated a few feet from the wellhead prior to gathering, and the
purchaser was not an interstate transmission company but a middle
man. The transmission company which purchased the gas from
the gatherer-processor sold a portion of the gas in interstate com-
merce and the remainder in intrastate commerce. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the producer was
engaged in a sale for resale within the purview of the act since
at least some portion of the gas was resold to consumers outside
the state where it was produced. The fact that a sale is consummated
at the wellhead prior to gathering is no longer pertinent, as the
court concluded that the point at which title and custody pass to
the purchaser, without arresting its movement to an ultimate in-
terstate destination, does not affect the interstate nature of the
transaction. 1 The producer's brief was quoted to show that there
was a "continuous flow" of gas from the well into interstate and
intrastate commerce, and the court emphasized that fact that the
gas had "commenced its journey in interstate commerce" when it
was sold by the producer to the gatherer-processor. After a review
of the legislative history of the act, the Interstate case and the
Phillips case, the Court concluded that the express exemption of
Section 1 (b) ". . . merely means that the physical activities, fa-
cilities and properties used by petitioner in the production and
gathering of natural gas are not within the Commission's power
of regulation."" Further, the opinion states:
: , . there is nothing in the Act which suggests, either expressly or by
implication, that by the exemption of production and gathering, Con-
gress intended that the wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce
which are consummated before the gas has been gathered or processed
should not be regarded as sales in such commerce over which the Com-
mission was granted exclusive jurisdiction.'"
Prior to the Deep South decision many producers contended that
raw casinghead gas was not "natural gas" within the meaning of the
act and that sales to a middleman who resold the production to an
interstate transmission company were not subject to the commission's
jurisdiction. The Deep South opinion repudiated both of these con-
tentions and necessitated additional certificate and rate schedule
filings by producers.
"This rule was also announced in Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 904 ($th Cir.
1957); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1561
(1957); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1562 (1957).




In Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC" the producer's counsel form-
ulated a unique argument. Saturn's contract provided that the point
of delivery would be within the christmas tree and title would pass
to the purchaser at this point. The producer did not own any facilities
above the surface of the earth other than the christmas tree. Saturn's
counsel contended that the producer owned no gas which moved
horizontally, interstate, or otherwise. Although the commission and
the court ruled adversely to the producer and held the sale was juris-
dictional, the court's opinion contains the following language which
partially clarifies one controversial issue:
Until there is a sale of the natural gas by such operations and installa-
tions in interstate commerce for resale, they (operations and facilities)
are exempt. In the event of such a sale the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion applies, but only to the extent the Natural Gas Act confers juris-
diction."5
Since the term "sale" imputes delivery, the commission's jurisdiction
apparently does not attach until deliveries are commenced or the
producer accepts a certificate. Therefore, a producer who has the
contractual right to withdraw from a proposed sale can exercise his
right to cancel the sales contract and withdraw his certificate and
rate filings prior to the initial delivery of gas thereunder provided,
however, the producer has not obligated himself to commence the sale
in proceedings before the commission."
In the Matter of Continental Oil Co."' also dealt with a sales con-
tract which provided for the transfer of title within the christmas
tree. The purchasing interstate transmission company was allowed
to regulate the rate of flow, but the contract provided that such
action was subject to control by the producer. The presiding exam-
iner found that the sale was not jurisdictional and did not recom-
mend the issuance of a certificate; however, the commission reversed
the examiner and issued the certificate. The first opinion primarily
relied upon the Phillips case to defeat the producer's contention that
the sale was non-jurisdictional since the sale occured before produc-
tion was completed and gathering had commenced. Further, the
commission held that control of the rate of flow does not necessarily
carry with it the producing connotation, particularly when the pro-
54250 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), affirming In the Matter of Saturn Oil & Gas Co., 16
F.P.C. 461, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 905 (1956).
5*250 F.2d at 68.
"See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959); Order is-
sued November 19, 1958, In the Matter of Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., Docket No.
G-4916.
5' 18 F.P.C. 296 (1957).
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ducer reserves the right to control the action of the purchaser. Thus
the commission took the position that the arrangement was merely
one of convenience and did not affect its authority.
The opinion issued by the commission in response to the producer's
application for rehearing"6 goes much farther. To substantiate its
position the commission interpreted the Phillips case to mean that a
sale in interstate commerce for resale, which occurs during the pro-
duction process, is nevertheless subject to the commission's juris-
diction. Furthermore, the commission concluded that its jurisdic-
tion attached the instant the gas was reduced to possession. After
finding that "natural gas becomes a subject of commerce when it is
reduced to possession" and the producer necessarily obtained posses-
sion at some point at or near the point of delivery, the commission
held the sale was jurisdictional due to the producer's possession and
the sale in interstate commerce for resale."
At the present time it is generally conceded that, with few ex-
ceptions, all sales of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale
consummated during production, gathering, processing, or trans-
mission will be held by the commission and the courts to be juris-
dictional. The commission has been very successful in upholding
its decisions upon judicial review, and there is no indication that
this will change in the foreseeable future. The exceptions that are
generally recognized involve sales of leases, s" sales of natural gas in
place, direct sales, and sales by companies that may qualify under
the Hinshaw Amendment."' During the next few years, however,
other exceptions may be created and recognized by the courts.
b. Production and Gathering Facilities.-As previously stated, the
decisions have reduced the express exemption of section 1 (b) of the
act to mean that only the producers' physical facilities, properties,
and activities related to the production and gathering of natural gas
are not subject to the commission's regulation. Therefore, the ques-
tion soon arose as to which production and gathering facilities are
exempt under section 1 (b), and which are jurisdictional facilities
subject to the provisions of section 7 of the act. If a facility is non-
's In the Matter of Continental Oil Co., 18 F.P.C. 528 (1957).
5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the com-
mission's decision: Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1959). However,
the majority opinion is directed to the regulatory status of the producer's facilities.
"0 See In the Matter of Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., ._.F.P.C.-. (1959), Opin-
ion No. 322, issued June 23, 1959, Docket Nos. G-12446, wherein the pipeline purchased
leases from independent producers and did not request authorization to make the acquisition;
the commission stated that it did not have the authority to certificate the acquisition, and
it denied intervenor's request which would require the introduction of cost evidence to sup-
port the sales price.
o1 Supra note 24.
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jurisdictional, an independent producer or gatherer may acquire,
construct, install, operate, and abandon the facility without auth-
orization from the commission; if a facility is jurisdictional, a pro-
ducer or gatherer must comply with the requirements of section 7
prior to engaging in any of these activities.
It is the commission's position that the references in section 7(c)
to "facilities therefor" and "such facilities" apply to those facilities
which serve the function of effecting a jurisdictional sale or trans-
portation of natural gas."a An early abandonment case supports the
commission's position; there the court relied on the Phillips case to
hold that the facilities which require certification by the commission
are those facilities that are used to effectuate a jurisdictional sale. 3
Although there are various facilities between the wellhead and the
point of delivery that are essential to make a connection with the
purchaser's system, essential facilities are not necessarily "sales fa-
cilities." The necessity of a facility is not the criteria, but the prin-
cipal consideration is the use and service of the facility. The direct-
ness and immediacy of the facility to the sale are factors which the
commission may consider. The commission has employed the prin-
ciple that only "sales facilities" are jurisdictional in order to control
the essential facilities while avoiding the administrative burden of
regulating those facilities that are not important for regulatory pur-
poses. Which production and gathering facilities, then, are considered
by the commission to be "sales facilities"?"
The Continental case" discussed in the preceding section also con-
6"In the Matter of Continental Oil Co., 18 F.P.C. 296, 18 F.P.C. 528 (1957); In the
Matter of Argo Oil Corp., 15 F.P.C. 601 (1956); In the Matter of Continental Oil Co., 16
F.P.C. 417, 16 F.P.C. 1 (1956).
6 j. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, supra note 17.
64A problem regarding facilities is usually not presented when a producer files a certifi-
cate application with the commission requesting authorization to make a sale at or near the
wellhead and the producer does not propose a jurisdictional transportation. The commission
has a standard clause which it inserts in orders authorizing producer sales to assert its au-
thority over jurisdictional facilities. This clause provides that the sale is authorized "together
with the construction and operation of any facilities, subject to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission, used for the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce." The commission is appar-
ently not concerned when production facilities are installed prior to the issuance of the cer-
tificate even though such facilities may be used to effect the sale of gas. In this connection,
at least one case has held that all production facilities are exempt until there is a jurisdic-
tional sale and the act of sale in interstate commerce for resale commits the facilities which
are necessary to effectuate the sale to regulation by the commission. Saturn Oil & Gas Co.
v. FPC, supra note 54. It is apparent that the commission desires to have at least one juris-
dictional facility at or near each point of delivery to perfect its jurisdiction, particularly for
the purposes of section 7 (b), although the provisions of section 7 (c) have not been strictly
enforced against independent producers. The problem of jurisdictional facilities is of con-
siderable importance when a gatherer intends to engage in a jurisdictional transportation as
the gatherer's operations are similar to the operations of a transmission company and the act
was designed to regulate this type of service.65 In the Matter of Continental Oil Co., supra note 62.
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cerned production facilities and the production and gathering ex-
emption of section 1 (b). Where a facility serves two functions
(effecting sales and producing or gathering natural gas), the com-
mission held that the affirmative grant of power in section 7 (c) is
dominant and its jurisdiction is not defeated by the production and
gathering exemption. Therefore, when the point of delivery is within
the christmas tree, which is a part of the well and technically a pro-
duction facility, it is immaterial that the christmas tree serves some
function other than effecting the sale. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the commission's decision;"
however, the court's opinion is not as extensive as the commission's
decision. Instead, the court took the christmas tree apart piece-by-
piece to find that one valve was a sales facility and that "production"
(within the meaning of the act and not within common usage in
the industry) was completed before the gas passed through that
particular valve. The opinion then states:
* , . we are faced primarily with the unambiguous and clear intent as
construed by the Supreme Court in the Phillips case to regulate these
interstate sales. Since it is in line with ordinary nontechnical usage, we
must give to the terms the meaning that will effectuate and not the
one that would frustrate the purpose of the law."
The court therefore concluded that the producer owned and op-
erated sales facilities which are subject to the jurisdiction of the com-
mission without expressly ruling that production facilities may also
be jurisdictional sales facilities.
In the Matter of Continental Oil Co." presented to the commission
a typical factual situation. The producer owned and operated the
following facilities between the wellhead and the point of delivery:
line from wellhead to heater, heater, line to separator, separator,
line to compressor, compressor, line to point of delivery, and an
adjustable choke. All facilities located between the outlet side of the
separator and the point of delivery, including the choke, were classi-
fied as "sales facilities" subject to the commission's regulation. The
remaining facilities were held to be production and gathering fa-
cilities within the exemption of section 1 (b). The sales facilities
were said to be immediately and directly concerned with the con-
summation of the sale, as the commission found that their "distinc-
tive function" was to effectuate the sale of natural gas.
The commission has developed a similar rule in those instances
"Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 59.
07 266 F.2d at 212.
88 16 F.P.C. 417, 16 F.P.C. 1 (1956).
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where a natural gas company does not produce or even purchase
natural gas in a given field but owns and operates a gathering sys-
tem. In such cases the commission considers the facilities located be-
tween the wellhead and the central point at which the production
enters a single line to be gathering facilities within the purview of
section 1 (b). Thus the gathering process has been completed when
the gas reaches the central point for delivery into a single line. Con-
sequently, all facilities owned by the gatherer between the central
point of "final commingling" and the point of delivery to the pur-
chasing interstate transmission company are jurisdictional and require
certification under the commission's interpretation of section 7 (c).
If production from a single well is involved and there is no com-
mingling before the gas is introduced into the facilities of the inter-
state transmission company, it is the commission's position that all
gathering facilities used to transport the production from the well-
head to the point of delivery are jurisdictional."
c. Processing Plants.-The commission has asserted its jurisdic-
tion over processing plants upon the assumption that processing is
necessary to make natural gas marketable and transportable and is
therefore an essential element of the natural gas business."0 The
courts have sustained the commission's decisions and condoned the
extension of federal regulation to this segment of the industry. 1
In Shell Oil Co. v. FPC" the principal question before the court
was whether a sale pursuant to a "standard casinghead contract" was
a sale for resale within the meaning of the act. A "standard casinghead
contract" effectuates a sale to a processor or plant owner with the
transfer of title to wet gas at some point on the upstream side of the
processing plant. In the usual situation the plant owner agrees to
extract all recoverable liquid hydrocarbons and deliver a percentage
of such products to the producer. The processor further agrees to sell
all surplus gas remaining after processing and to pay the producer a
designated percentage of the proceeds derived from the sale of residue
gas attributable to the producer's properties.
After the commission asserted its jurisdiction over the sale by Shell
to the processor, Shell petitioned the Fifth Circuit to review the
commission's order. The court upheld the commission's action and
"In the Matter of Barnes Transportation Co., 18 F.P.C. 369, 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1527
(1957); In the Matter of Texas Gas Corp., 18 F.P.C. 397 (1957).
" City of Columbus v. United Fuel Gas Co., 5 F.P.C. 279 (1946); In the Matter of
Cities Service Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 459 (1943); In the Matter of Hope Natural Gas Co., 3
F.P.C. 150 (1942).
"Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1539 (1957);
Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 51; Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 28.
72 Supra note 51.
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held that the sale at or near the wellhead under the terms of a stand-
ard casinghead contract was jurisdictional."3 The producer's interest
in the sale of the residue gas and the processing operations would
therefore be subjected to federal regulation. The court further stated
that the question of jurisdiction is not to be determined by the parties
use of the term "manufacture" in the sales contract but upon the
actual disposition of the gas. In Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC'4 the
court went further and held that gas processing was not "manufac-
turing" but "merely a part of the business of transporting and mar-
keting gas in interstate commerce" since the product had commenced
its journey in interstate commerce at the time of the sale and the
processing did not interrupt the interstate journey. In the Matter of
Continental Oil Co."' held that an interstate transmission company
acted as agent or trustee for the producer in the operation of a
processing plant pro tanto or to the extent that the producer con-
tributed to the total stream of gas processed by the pipeline com-
pany's plant.
The commission has regulated the processing operations of inter-
state transmission companies by the traditional rate base method,
with profits above the return allowed the processor being appro-
priated to the benefit of the consumer of the residue gas. Disposition
of excess earnings has been made in this manner in cases where the
processing operations were conducted by a transmission company
or a third party and where such operations were or were not actually
necessary to make the gas marketable and transportable.'"
The commission has not announced a policy regarding the process-
ing facilities and operations of independent producers; thus the ap-
plicability of sections 4, 5, and 7 of the act in such cases is not clear
at this date. Moreover, in at least two cases the commission has held
that processing plants are non-jurisdictional although located on
jurisdictional pipelines, apparently atttempting to change its prior
policy in the Panhandle Eastern case."
Some authorities advocate treating all plant operations and facilities
as jurisdictional except those directly related to the business of ex-
78 247 F.2d at 902.
74 Supra note 71.
"3 16 F.P.C. 417, 16 F.P.C. 1 (1956).
76 Jacobs, Governmental Regulation of Gas Production, Louisiana State Univ. Fourth
Annual Institute on Mineral Law 43, 51 (1956).
77 See Jacobs, Problems Incident to the Marketing of Gas, Southwestern Legal Foundation
Fifth Annual Institute on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 271, 298 (1954). In the Matter of Pan-
handle Eastern Pipe Line Co., .. F.P.C.. (1954) held that processing was non-jurisdiction-
al as processing was unnecessary to produce marketable gas, but the commission was reversed
in City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), because of the lack of adequate
evidence to support its findings.
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tracting liquids. Under this procedure there would be a division of
plant property and expenses. That portion of the plant investment
related to making gas merchantable and transportable would be in-
cluded in the rate base for a return, but absorbers and other extrac-
tion facilities would be excluded. The processor would receive a
return by the traditional method on jurisdictional operations, but
the profit or loss resulting from the extraction business would be
received or borne by the processor. Since the extraction of liquids
shrinks the volume and lowers the BTU content of the gas stream,
these authorities contend that an adjustment should be made to shift
the economic burden of these two incidents of processing to the
extraction business.
d. Commingled Gas.-A controversy may easily arise when a
natural gas company is engaged in both jurisdictional and non-juris-
dictional businesses on a single pipeline or lateral. One line of cases
hold that the commingling of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
gas will result in the extension of federal regulation to the non-
jurisdictional business."8 In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC"7
the Supreme Court condoned the confiscation of the pipeline's profit
above the 6/27% return realized from a non-jurisdictional direct
sale and the appropriation of such profit to reduce the rates of juris-
dictional sales. The Court admitted that the act does not give the
commission authority to disregard the jurisdictional lines that Con-
gress has drawn between interstate wholesales and direct industrial
sales to level the profits between the two classes of business; never-
theless, the Court upheld the commission's order stating that in the
exceptional circumstances under consideration-the small investment
required to make the direct sale, the incremental nature of such sale,
the lack of a practical means of segregating the cost and property,
and the failure of the company to insist on segregation or allocation
in its petition for rehearing-the commission did not exceed the
limits of its discretion when it allocated to the regulated business the
earnings over the return derived from a non-jurisdictional trans-
action.
This result is clearly contrary to the congressional intent, and
it is submitted that the commission should be required to segregate
the jurisdictional from the non-jurisdictional business when actual
segregation is possible and to employ a suitable allocation formula
78Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414 (1952); Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 232 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir. 1956); State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, supra
note 28.
7'324 U.S. 635 (1945).
[Vol. 13
NATURAL GAS ACT
in other instances. A number of cases have recognized the identity
of non-jurisdictional sales as separate and distinct transactions even
where the subject matter of these sales is commingled with juris-
dictional gas. These cases require the commission to segregate or
allocate joint costs and investments."0 A separation or allocation of
property, capital, expenses, and revenue is essential in order to con-
fine the commission's regulation to the jurisdictonal functions of
the natural gas company. Accordingly, when the commission utilizes
a particular allocation formula, the courts have stated that the
commission is exercising a legislative function and thus have ac-
cepted the allocation formula employed by the commission so long
as the formula does not contravene the statutory scheme of regu-
lation. '
Segregation or allocation of the various items of expense and
investment is particularly important in independent producer cases
since the producer may be engaged in farming, ranching, manu-
facturing, hard rock mining, or other businesses as well as opera-
tions related to the production of oil and other liquid hydrocarbons.
Thus far the commission has respected the non-jurisdictional na-
ture of the producers' operations that do not involve a jurisdic-
tional sale or transportation of natural gas and activities immedi-
ately related thereto. With respect to producer sales, however, the
decisions discussed previously indicate it is the position of the com-
mission and the courts that so long as a portion of the commingled
gas stream is sold in interstate commerce for resale, the entire sub-
ject matter of the producer's sale is subject to federal regulation.
Therefore, in a case where the purchasing transmission company
transports and sells only 10% of the production in interstate com-
merce, the total volume of gas sold by the producer is subject to
federal rate regulation, and there is no segregation or allocation
to restrict the commission's regulation to the undivided 10% of the
production which is ultimately introduced into interstate commerce.
Recently the commission recognized that jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional sales may be segregated by the contract between the
so North Dakota v. FPC, 247 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1957); City of Hastings v. Kansas-
Neb. Gas Co., 221 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Col6rado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 183
F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1950). See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 155 Tex.
483, 289 S.W.2d 547 (1955).
81 See Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 626 (1945); Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635 (1945); State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206
F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953); Alabama-Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 203 F.2d 494
(3rd Cir. 1953); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 163 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1947);
Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 155 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1946); Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. FPC, 142 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1944).
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parties and by the treatment accorded the transactions. A producer
commingled jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional gas during gather-
ing and processing; but the commission held that gas destined for in-
trastate consumption does not become subject to its jurisdiction
merely becuse it is commingled with jurisdictional gas during a por-
tion of its transmission."" On the basis of this decision, a producer
may maintain the identity of a non-jurisdictional sale by proper lease
dedication, separate measurement, and accurate accounting with re-
spect to each sale, and may utilize a single gathering system to trans-
port the commingled stream of gas. However, this situation should
be avoided when economically feasible due to the judicial decisions
which refuse to recognize the severability of the two transactions.
e. Direct Sales.-The act effectuates the power of Congress to
regulate the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,
its sale in interstate commerce for resale, and natural gas companies
engaged in such transportation or sale. Sales by an interstate trans-
mission company directly to an industrial consumer are exempted
from the application of the act, and the commission has no authority
to regulate the price charged these customers."3 Direct sales to the
ultimate consumer are subject to state regulation, which is not pre-
cluded by the fact that the product is sold or transported in inter-
state commerce. 4 In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission" the Supreme Court held that direct sales
were sales in interstate commerce, but it upheld state control solely
because Congress had not provided federal regulations over such
sales. "To any other . . . sale" in section 1 (b) means that the act
shall not apply to any sale other than a sale for resale. Direct sales are
excluded from the jurisdiction of the commission whether they are
for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use." Where the
sales are made for resale to an industrial consumer, such sales are
"In the Matter of Houston Natural Gas Prod. Co., ___F.P.C... (1959), issued
March 31, 1959, Docket No. G-9046.53 FPC v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 336 U.S. 557 (1949); Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. PPC, supra note 78; City of Hastings v. Kansas-Neb. Gas Co., supra note 80; State Corp.
Comm'n v. FPC, supra note 81; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FPC, 141 F.2d 27
(8th Cir. 1944); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n,
328 Mich. 650, 44 N.W. 2d 324 (1950). But see Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
FPC, supra note 81.
"Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329
(1947); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); Illnois Natural Gas Co.
v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas,
304 U.S. 224 (1938); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920).
83332 U.S. 507 (1947).
86 Id. at 516-17.
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subject to the jurisdiction of the commission;8 7 however, the com-
mission does not have the authority to suspend rate increases where
the sale for resale is made for industrial use only."
The commission does not have the power to regulate direct sales
or the rates charged thereunder; thus a producer may sell his pro-
duction directly to the ultimate consumer and avoid federal rate
regulation over the field sale, but this does not mean commission
supervision is entirely lacking in such cases. To the contrary, the
commission retains its jurisdiction over the transmission company
and the interstate transportation of the natural gas delivered to the
direct customer. The transmission company must secure the necessary
authorization for the transportation of such gas and the construc-
tion and operation of the required facilities. Therefore, the com-
mission is given the opportunity to consider the plans and specifi-
cations, the economic feasibility, and the effect of the proposed
project on present services to existing customers. Regulation of the
transportation of natural gas has been held to be completely inde-
pendent of rate regulation; 9 hence the commission may regulate the
transportation charge received by an interstate transmission com-
pany when a producer sells natural gas directly to the ultimate con-
sumer and the transmission company merely receives a fee for trans-
mission.
In the Matter of Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp."° involved
a pipeline's request for authorization to transport gas purchased by
Consolidated Edison Company of New York from producers
in Texas for use as boiler fuel in Consolidated Edison's generating
plants. The commission denied the application principally on the
grounds that such transportation would pre-empt transmission fa-
cilities which would otherwise be available for more beneficial uses9'
and that the direct sales in the field would eventually result in higher
field prices. The commission's staff opposed the project, contending
that it was not in the public interest since the commission's regulation
over the field prices would be avoided. In this connection the com-
mission's opinion states:
8 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 84, at 596.
15 U.S.C.A. § 717c. (e) (1948). See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service
Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
89 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, supra note 78.
" 21 F.P.C. 138 (1959).
" The commission stated that the use to be made of the transported gas is relevant in
determining whether the transportation of such gas is required by the public convenience
and necessity. See National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But see
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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The impact of large demand on relatively limited supply is certain
enough to raise rates and field prices if only one bidder is bringing that
demand to bear on the supply. How much more serious is that impact
when it is in the form of multiple bidders, each attempting to reserve
to itself a firm supply. Inevitably, there would be upward pressure on
rate levels in the fields. We do not believe we ought to encourage such
when it is unnecessary."'
Thus, the commission announced the policy of employing its
jurisdiction over interstate transportation to discourage non-juris-
dictional direct sales in an attempt to prevent increases in field prices.
Consolidated Edison has petitioned the Third Circuit to review the
commission's order.
C. Rules And Regulations.
Since the act did not expressly provide for the regulation of in-
dependent producers or gatherers, it was essential that the com-
mission formulate rules and regulations under the authority of sec-
tion 16 of the act" to prescribe the method and procedure of such
regulation. The commission issued its No. 174 series of orders re-
quiring independent producers and gatherers, which are "natural
gas companies" by virtue of the Phillips decision, to file certain
materials. The regulations require certain producers to make cer-
tificate and rate filings to provide the basis for federal regulation
over the producing industry.
The initial regulations required the independent producers to con-
tinue all jurisdictional sales and services in effect on June 7, 1954,
unless permission to abandon was obtained from the commission.
All independent producers who were engaged in a jurisdictional
transportation or sale on June 7, 1954, were required to file certifi-
cate applications requesting authorization to continue such sale or
service. Independent producers may not engage in a new jurisdic-
tional sale or service prior to the issuance of a certificate authorizing
such sale or service." The regulations prescribe the form and con-
tents of producer certificate applications."
Pursuant to the provisions of section 7(c) of the act, the com-
mission's regulations prescribe the circumstances in which a producer
may obtain a temporary authorization to engage in a jurisdictional
sale or service. The regulations authorize jurisdictional sales and
operations without a certificate for a period not to exceed sixty days
92 21 F.P.C. at 141.
0als U.S.C.A. § 7170. (1948).
41g C.F.R. 157.23 (1958 Supp.).
5 18 C.F.R. § 157.24-157.26 (1958 Supp.).
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when imminent danger to life or property can be eliminated by such
sale or transportation. In such cases the producer must notify the
commission immediately by telegram or letter briefly stating the cir-
cumstances which constitute the emergency, and the producer must
file a statement under oath within ten days setting forth the purpose
and character of the sale or transportation, the rate charged, the facts
warranting invocation of the emergency provisions, and the antici-
pated period of danger."
In the event an emergency arises which does not involve imminent
danger to life or property, e.g., drainage, loss of a lease, flaring of
gas, or economic hardship, the producer may request temporary auth-
orization to commence the sale or transportation necessary to
remedy the situation immediately by separate filing of the
request or by including such request in the certificate application.
To invoke this section of the regulations, the proposed sale or service
must not necessitate the termination of any other sale or service,
and the proposed date for initial deliveries must be within thirty days
from the date of filing. The contract covering the proposed sale or
service must be on file with the commission, and the producer's re-
quest must identify the contract and set forth the facts that con-
stitute the emergency. After receiving notice of the issuance of the
temporary authorization, the proposed sale or transportation may be
commenced and continued, pending a final determination in the
regular certificate proceeding. A producer may not secure temporary
authorization for a jurisdictional sale unless the purchaser has been
authorized to construct the facilities necessary to make the connec-
tion or such facilities do not require certification by the commission."
A producer is not entitled to a temporary authorization when the
sale or service has been commenced and is being continued without
the authorization of the commission."8
At an early date it became apparent that the commission would be
forced to devise some method to regulate independent producers
and gatherers more efficiently because of the enormity and com-
plexity of the undertaking and the limited resources and personnel
available to the agency. Hence, the question arose as to which trans-
actions in the gas fields should come under the commission's direct
supervision since direct supervision of all transactions decreed to be
jurisdictional by the Phillips case was clearly impossible.
The regulations define "independent producer" as "any person as
96 18 C.F.R. S 157.29 (1958 Supp.).
9718 C.F.R. § 157.28 (1958 Supp.).
asSee Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1953).
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defined in the Natural Gas Act who is engaged in the production or
gathering of natural gas and who transports natural gas in interstate
commerce or sells natural gas in interstate commerce for resale, but
who is not primarily engaged in the operation of an interstate pipe
line."" The regulations proceed to define and prescribe which "in-
dependent producers" are denied the right, given the option, and
required to make certificate and rate filings.
The most common problems in this area arise in those situations
where several producers enter into an agreement for the development
and operation of jointly-owned leases or units. The operating agree-
ments appoint one of the producers as the "operator" of the property
and provide that the non-operators may take their share of produc-
tion in kind, and, if a non-operator fails to take or dispose of his
share of production, the operator may sell the non-operator's pro-
duction and account to the owner for the proceeds. If the operator
is a signatory party to the gas sales contract the commission's regula-
tions require him to make all required filings for himself and for co-
owners who elect to sell gas under his contract and who are denied
the right to, or elect to refrain from, making the required filings on
their own behalf."' In addition to the usual certificate and rate filings,
the operator must file, as a part of his certificate application, the
following: (1) a copy of the contract of sale; (2) the names and
percentum of ownership of co-owners whose production is to be
delivered to the purchaser under the terms of such contract; and (3)
a copy of the operating agreement or a sales authorization showing
the operator's authority to sell production owned by co-owners who
did not execute the contract of sale. The operator must also file an
annual statement indicating any changes in ownership of the working
interests occuring subsequent to the filing of the previous state-
ment.' 1
Notwithstanding such filings by the operator, non-operators who
are signatory parties to the contract of sale have an election to make,
or to refrain from making, certificate and rate filings."' Non-operat-
tors who are not signatory parties to the contract of sale are denied
the right to make certificate and rate filings; thus, a non-signatory
party may not maintain a rate schedule even in those cases where the
operator fails or refuses to comply with the requirements of the act
and regulations. Where a non-signatory party has reserved the right
9918 C.F.R. § 154.91(a) (1958 Supp.).
10018 C.F.R. § 154.91(b)(1) (1958 Supp.).
10118 C.F.R. § 154.91(b) (2) (3) (1958 Supp.).
102 Supra note 100.
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to take in kind, however, he may exercise such right after obtaining
authorization to abandon the existing sale of his share of production
by the operator and authorization to commence the proposed new
sale. Only after complying with the requirements of section 7 (b)
and section 7(c) of the act and filing a rate schedule pursuant to
section 4(c) can a non-signatory party enforce his right to take in
kind, to dispose of his share of production and to maintain a separate
rate schedule covering the new sale. ' In the event that the operator
has not made initial deliveries to the purchaser or the operator has
commenced deliveries without purporting to deliver natural gas
attributable to the non-signatory party's undivided interest, section
7(b) would apparently be inapplicable (since the operator's action
would not constitute a jurisdictional "sale" of the non-signatory
party's share of production).'"
When a producer sells natural gas to the operator of a processing
plant at a price which represents a percentage of the proceeds derived
from the resale of residue gas, the plant operator must make the re-
quired filings and submit additional information similar to the addi-
tional material which an operator of a producing unit or lease would
normally file.1"' When the operator is an interstate transmission com-
pany and the operator introduces the production into its transmission
system, the transmission company must file a statement giving the
names and percentum of ownership of the co-owners, and all co-
owners must make the required certificate and rate filings. '
In the event the unit, lease, or plant operator is not a signatory
party to the contract of sale, each signatory party is responsible for
making the required filings; however, filings may be made by one
signatory co-owner to cover all or a part of the other signatory co-
owners. The party (or parties) who files the certificate application
must give the additional information which the operator would
ordinarily include in his certificate application. '
Thus, the regulations provide that, in certain instances, a producer
is not required to obtain a certificate before commencing a jurisdic-
tional sale of his undivided interest in a commingled stream of gas.
If a producer is not a signatory party to the contract of sale, he may
not make the usual filings; if a producer is a signatory non-operator,
he may elect to refrain from making such filings. This does not mean
103s C.F.R. § 154.91(d) (1958 Supp.).
... See authorities cited note 56 supra.
10 18 C.F.R. S 154.91(e) (1958 Supp.).
10018 C.F.R. § 154.91(c)(2) (1958 Supp.).
107 18 C.F.R. § 154.91(c)(1) (1958 Supp.).
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the interstate sale for resale is non-jurisdictional. The jurisdictional
transaction and the natural gas company remain subject to the com-
mission's regulation; however, the commission asserts its certification
and rate powers in an indirect manner. The operator's rate schedule
reflects the legally effective rate applicable to the sale of gas by the
operator and the non-operators who do not make the necessary filings
and are covered by the operator's rate schedule. The commission
authorizes the sale by the operator and such other parties by the
issuance of the certificate to the "Operator et al." On the other hand,
signatory non-operators who elect to make the required filings, obtain
authorization to engage in the sale of their undivided interest, and file
separate rate schedules applicable to such sales are regulated by the
commission's supervision over their own rate schedules.
The orders and decisions of the commission indicate that it is the
commission's policy to apply orders issued pursuant to sections 7 (c),
4(c), 4(d), and 4(e) to the operator and all producers covered by
the operator's rate schedule, but to apply orders issued pursuant to
section 7(b) to the operator only. Therefore, a non-operator who
desires to abandon a sale authorized by the operator's certificate must
file an application to abandon such sale or join in the operator's
abandonment application. On the other hand, should the commission
assert its rate review powers under section 4 of the act over the sale
by the operator et al, a rate proceeding would be instituted against
the operator pursuant to section 4 (e) of the act, and the rates of all
parties covered by the operator's rate schedule would be affected by
the final order of the commission. It is generally believed that the
commission will determine a just and reasonable rate for the operator,
and the non-operators will receive the rate allowed the operator. As a
result of this procedure, the non-operators would not be necessary
parties to the rate proceeding, but they could intervene to protect
their interests. However, the commission's staff has taken the position
in a proceeding presently before an examiner that the operator and
the non-operators should not receive the indentical rate although they
are covered by the same rate schedule. If the staff succeeds in this
connection, parties other than the operator may eventually be re-
quired to present evidence in support of the increased rate.
Since the issuance of Order 190 the commission has issued numer-
ous orders which, in essence, state that a non-operating working
interest owner has no standing to file a certificate application seeking
authorization for a sale pursuant to a contract to which he is not a
signatory party. The commission has vacated virtually all certificates
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granted non-signatory co-owners prior to the issuance of Order 190.
In the Cotton Valley case " the Cotton Valley Operators Committee
conducted a field-wide unitization and pressure maintenance program
under the terms and provisions of one of the earlier field-wide unit-
ization agreements. This agreement did not appoint one of the eighty-
eight producers as the operator but established a committee of the
producers' representatives to operate the unitized area in accordance
with the terms of the agreement. The original agreement authorized
the committee to execute gas sales contracts, but the agreement was
later amended to revoke this authority. Subsequently, the producers
executed sales contracts which prescribed jurisdictional sales. Prior
to the amendment the committee entered into a contract for the sale of
gas to an interstate transmission company, which sale became subject
to the commission's regulation effective June 7, 1954. The commis-
sion held that: (1) the agent (committee) was a natural gas com-
pany subject to the provisions of the act; and (2) the agent was re-
quired to file a certificate application and a rate schedule applicable to
the sale pursuant to the contract executed by the committee. The
principals' (producers') certificates and rate schedules were vacated
and rejected; and the commission ordered the. refund of a sum of
money collected by the principals (subject to refund) under the re-
jected rate schedules. The commission has granted rehearing and
stayed its order; considerable time will probably elapse before this
case reaches the courts.
Sun Oil Co. v. FPC"n represents the only judicial decision to pass
on the validity of Order 190. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit upheld the order as a valid exercise of the com-
mission's rule-making power; the court emphasized the fact that the
producer failed to show injury as a result of the rejection of its rate
schedule and the cancelation of its certificate. The court considered
Order 190 to be merely a procedural rule that does not affect the
producers' substantive rights. However, when the effect of Order 190
is considered together with the trend in producer cases to regulate
rates on the basis of cost and investment, it is submitted that Order
190 should be set aside. The "non-signatory rule," coupled with the
rate base method, will result in confiscation in many cases. Confisca-
tion could result in the event a producer's rate is fixed on the basis
of another producer's cost and investment; furthermore, the purpose
of Order 190 is partially defeated if each co-owner is required to
present evidence in the rate proceeding.
... In the Matter of Midstates Oil Corp., 20 F.P.C. 70 (1958).
'09256 F.2d 233 (Sth Cir. 1958).
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D. Duration And Abandonment
1. Duration of Certificate Authorization
Section 7 (c) of the act provides that no natural gas company shall
engage in a jurisdictional sale or transportation, or undertake the
construction, extension, acquisition, or operation of jurisdictional
facilities unless the company has obtained a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity authorizing such acts or operations.110 This
section also contains two provisos. The first is a grandfather clause
which provides for the continuance of services being rendered on the
effective date of the act, and the second proviso authorizes the com-
mission to issue temporary certificates without notice and hearing.
Section 7(e) of the act authorizes the commission to attach to
the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted
thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public con-
venience and necessity may require,"" and sets forth the statutory re-
quirements imposed upon an applicant in a certificate case. When an
applicant meets these statutory requirements, section 7 (e) provides
that a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant "authorizing
the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, construction,
extension, or acquisition covered by the application. . . ." Thus, a
literal interpretation of the act indicates that a producer must file
a certificate application in which he proposes to perform certain acts
or operations, and the commission, after notice and hearing, may issue
a permanent certificate authorizing all or any portion of the acts or
operations proposed by the applicant.
Certificate applications filed by the majority of the producers re-
quest authorization to engage in a sale of natural gas pursuant to a
particular gas sales contract. The sales contract is either attached to
the application as an exhibit or incorporated by reference to the com-
mission files. The typical sales contract provides a specific or determin-
able date on which it will expire by its own terms or by notice. Con-
sidering the above provisions of section 7 (e), it would appear that
the certificate application is a proposal to sell certain volumes of gas
for a period of limited duration, and that the commission could
authorize the proposed sale in whole or in part but could not validly
issue a certificate authorizing the sale after the expiration date of the
gas sales contract or require the producer to deliver a volume of gas
in excess of the contract quantity. However, the commission has tak-
"o 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f.(c) (1948).
.. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f.(e) (1948).
"2 See pp. 497-505 infra.
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en the position that the abandonment provisions of section 7 (b) are
controlling and that all certificates are for an unlimited period of
time unless the commission expressly authorizes the termination of
services at a future date. The commission has therefore concluded
that a certificate of limited duration is in effect only in those cases
where the producer has applied for a conditional certificate under
section 7(e) and the commission has granted the condition with its
issuing order providing that the certificate shall remain in full force
and effect for a designated period. In this manner, the commission
has shifted the burden of proof to the producer to prove that a
qualified or limited certificate is required by the public convenience
and necessity. When a sale is authorized by the usual or unlimited
certificate, the producer must continue the sale until the commission
authorizes the abandonment at the conclusion of a section 7(b)
proceeding.
The commission has held that the issuance of certificates of limited
duration is contrary to the public interest and has refused to issue
qualified certificates in several instances.'13 The commission's policy in
these cases has been expressed as follows:
... the extent of the service the company must ultimately render will
be determined at some future time if and when it seeks permission to
abandon service, a matter which we cannot . . . attempt to anticipate
in this (certificate) case."'
We agree with the presiding examiner that the service here certificated
should not be abandoned except with our permission and for good cause
shown after appropriate proceedings . . . in which all interested parties
will have an opportunity to participate and to protect their interests.115
Should the commission issue a certificate limited to the term of the
gas sales contract, it is generally believed that the producer could
enter into a new sale upon the termination of the contract and dedi-
cate his reserves to the same or another purchaser without securing
permission from the commission to abandon the first sale. Of course,
the producer must apply for additional authorization if the second
sale is to be a jurisdictional sale.
1 In the Matter of Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., _P.C. (1959), issued June 19,
1959, Docket No. G-4063; In the Matter of Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 1107
(1958); In the Matter of Continental Oil Co., 16 F.P.C. 1 (1956); order issued December
15, 1958, In the Matter of Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., Docket No. G-2975; order issued
August 8, 1958, In the Matter of Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co.. Docket No. G-8286.
114 In the Matter of Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 1107, 1108 (1958).




In Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC"' the commission con-
tended that it did not have the authority to issue certificates of
limited duration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held, inter alia, that the commission has the authority to issue
certificates limited to a specific period of time. The Supreme Court
affirmed this portion of the opinion in a per curiam decision." '
In another Sunray1 ' case the Tenth Circuit held that a producer
may not provide for the cessation or discontinuance of a sale on a
specified future date simply by so providing in the gas sales contract
and a jurisdictional sale cannot be terminated until the commission
authorizes the abandonment in a proceeding initiated under section
7 (b). In effect, the court ruled that the commission has the authority
to issue a certificate requiring the sale of larger quantities of gas over
a longer period of time than required by the gas sales contract with-
out receiving evidence or entering findings to the effect that the addi-
tional taking for public use is required by the public convenience and
necessity." 9
In the Gwinville cases"" the court reviewed five certificate applica-
tions which requested authorization to make a particular sale of gas
pursuant to a gas sales contract prescribing a ten-year term. In four
of these cases the commission issued the producer a permanent cer-
tificate which authorized the sale "as more fully described in the ap-
plication and exhibits." The producers argued that the contracts and
the certificates expired simultaneously upon the dates provided by the
contracts. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the certificate author-
ization was not only for the sale of gas pursuant to the contract but
"pursuant to and subject to the provisions of the Act and regulations
pursuant thereto by the Commission.' 2. 1 The court recognized that
the commission has the authority to grant certificates limited to the
life of the contract, but the opinion states that the court saw nothing
to indicate that the producers applied for, or the commission granted,
certificates of limited duration. This decision indicates that when a
producer makes a jurisdictional sale and enters into a completely new
contract upon the expiration of the initial one, the second contract
11 239 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 914 (1956).
...Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 353 U.S. 944 (1957).
11 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 267 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1959).
119 The court stated that the commission must have this power if the public is to be
provided adequate, reasonable, and continuous service. 267 F.2d at 473.
Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1959); Richardson v. FPC, 266
F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1959); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1959); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1959); Hunt Oil Co. v.
FPC, 266 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1959).
12' 266 F.2d at 225-26.
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does not prescribe a new, separate, and distinct "sale" within the
meaning of section 1 (b) of the act. Thus, the producer is not re-
quired to obtain additional certificate authority in this instance.
2. Abandonment
The controversial abandonment provision of the act is set forth
in section 7(b) which provides:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered
by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the
Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by
the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to
the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the
present or future public convenience and necessity permit such aban-
donment."5 1
Although several years may elapse before the full impact of the above
section is determined, several decisions concerning abandonments
have been rendered which are worthy of comment.
Section 7(b) of the act requires natural gas companies to obtain
permission from the commission prior to the abandonment of
" ..all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities
... ." Although section 7 (b) does not expressly require commission
approval prior to the abandonment of a jurisdictional "sale" of
natural gas, the decisions have extended the provisions of section 7
(b) to producer sales.
With respect to production facilities, it is the commission's position
that "sales facilities" may not be abandoned unless the producer
complies with the provisions of section 7(b) but the producer need
not file an application to abandon other production facilities. As a
practical matter, however, producers have not requested permission
to abandon when production or sales facilities are removed or re-
placed and the sale is continued; there has been no indication that
the commission would welcome abandonment applications in such
cases. Moreover, the great majority of the producers have either failed
or refused to file abandonment applications when their producing
properties are depleted and the sale is discontinued.
Numerous controversies arose over abandonments pursuant to
escape clauses which allowed the producer to cancel the contract of
sale when federal regulation was extended to independent producers.
Efforts to terminate sales in such cases generally have been unsuccess-
122 15 U.S.C.A. S 717f.(b) (1948).
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ful. Service to the public has been said to be the foundation of gas
purchase contract operation; having relied upon such service through
the years, the public is entitled to its continuance. To permit the
commission's power over sales to be nullified by the abandonment of
those sales at the will of the producers has been held to be contrary
to the public interest."3
In J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC124 the commission had previously held
that certain gathering facilities were used to effect the sale of natural
gas in interstate commerce. The Third Circuit said that this finding
was supported by the record and that these facilities are "sales fa-
cilities" under the Phillips decision. The court therefore concluded
that such facilities, which effected a jursdictional sale, came within
the provisions of section 7(c) and 7(b) and are subject to the juris-
diction and regulation of the commission. Although the sale had been
commenced prior to June 7, 1954, and continued thereafter, the
producer had stated that it was not willing to accept the certificate or
comply with the -requirements of section 7 (e). However, the court
held that the certificate was proper and binding on the company as
the "jurisdictional sections of the act, 1 (b) and 7 (b), obviously do
not rely upon the certificate provisions of 7 (c)..... Thus, once a sale
of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale is commenced, the
sale cannot be abandoned without authorization from the commission
even though the commission has not authorized the sale and the
producer refuses to comply with the requirements of the act and the
commission's rules and regulations thereunder. Therefore, it is ap-
parent that jurisdiction attaches because of deliveries and the com-
mission's jurisdiction is not dependent upon the issuance of a certi-
ficate of public convenience and necessity. Certain language in the
Supreme Court's recent CATCO decision supports this conclusion."'
In the Gwinville cases, 127 the producers entered into new contracts
with the same purchaser and the new contracts were to become effec-
tive upon the expiration of the initial contracts. The ultimate ques-
tion before the court was whether the second contract prescribed a
new and separate "sale" within the meaning of section 1 (b) of the
act and, as an incident thereto, whether the commission must author-
ize the abandonment of the initial sale before a certificate could be
123 j. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 550, 558 (3rd Cir. 1956).
14 Id. See In the Matter of Argo Oil Corp., 15 F.P.C. 601, 5 Oil & Gas Rep. 824
(1956); In the Matter of Dixie Pipe Line Co., --F.P.C._ 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 1837
(1955), Opinion No. 285 issued September 9, 1955.
122236 F.2d at 557.126 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
121 Cases cited note 120 supra. See Shank v. FPC, 236 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956); Lee v.
FPC, 236 F.2d 835 (sth Cir. 1956).
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issued and a rate schedule accepted covering the second sale. The pro-
ducers contended that section 7 (b) was not applicable because (1)
their initial certificates had expired, (2) they were simply engaged
in sales of gas, and (3) they did not render any "service" nor own or
operate any facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the commission.
The court ruled that the second contract was merely a "change" in
rate schedule under section 4 of the act, and, in effect, held that both
transactions constituted one "sale" under section 1 (b). Consequently,
there was no abandonment.
The applicability of section 7 (b) to sales authorized by temporary
authorizations has not been finally determined. Section 7(c) of the
act authorizes the commission to issue "temporary certificates" in cer-
tain cases for certain purposes "pending the determination of an ap-
plication for a certificate. . . ." Under this language of the statute,
a temporary certificate is only to be effective until the application for
a permanent certificate has been granted or denied. Section 7(e) of
the act requires the commission to issue a permanent certificate if the
applicant makes the statutory showing; otherwise the application is
to be denied. If the certificate is granted but deliveries have not been
commenced, the producer-applicant may refuse to accept the per-
manent certificate."8 If deliveries have commenced under a temporary
authorization, the courts may find that section 7(b) is controlling
and may require the producer to accept the permanent certificate and
to continuue the sale until abandonment is authorized in a section
7(b) proceeding. However, the act does not expressly authorize the
commission to issue a temporary certificate which is to remain in
effect beyond the date of the commission's final action upon the
pending application for a permanent certificate. Consequently, the
act should be interpreted to mean the temporary authorization au-
tomatically expires on the date the commission finally acts on the
application for a permanent certificate and that section 7 (b) is not
applicable to the sale in the event the application is denied or the
producer refuses to accept the permanent certificate due to the im-
position of unacceptable conditions. The courts may issue another
"necessity" opinion and reach the opposite result, but this would
be illogical in a case where the commission finds that the proposed
sale is not required by the public convenience and necessity and re-
fuses to issue a permanent certificate."'
... See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra note 126; In the Matter of
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 20 F.P.C. 730 (1958).
... Since the date of this writing, this issue was presented to the Tenth Circuit in Sunray
Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, .-- F.2d_ (10th Cir. 1959) but the court did not decide
the question because the petition was dismissed as being premature. See note 267 infra.
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Before the commission may authorize an abandonment, it must
conduct a hearing and enter an express finding that "the available
supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of
service is unwarranted" or that "the present or future public conven-
ience and necessity permit such abandonment." Independent produc-
ers have been unsuccessful in most abandonment proceedings thus
far, as it is not in the public interest to allow the abandonment of a
sale thereby permitting the producer to enter into a new sale which
provides a substantially higher price. However, the price paid for
natural gas is not the sole concern of the commission in an abandon-
ment proceeding. The "public interest" or "public convenience and
necessity" determination encompasses all factors which have a bear-
ing upon the quality and quantity of the service rendered by the
natural gas company. For example, an abandonment was authorized
in the case of In the Matter of Atlantic Ref. Co."' which permitted
an increase in price from 50 per Mcf. to 14.60 per Mcf. under the
terms of a contract offered by a competing pipeline. The revenue
provided by the new sale justified the construction of new facilities
which would result in the production of approximately seven times
the volume delivered under the abandoned sale and the conservation
of an amount of gas equal to the volume delivered under the previous
sale.
Recently the commission modified its previous policy regarding
abandonments in certain situations. The commission has required
pipelines to file abandonment applications in those cases where an-
other pipeline was purchasing a portion of its system and the pur-
chaser was to continue the identical services performed by its pre-
decessor. When producing leases are dedicated to the performance of
a gas sales contract, the sale of such leases by the producer may be
made subject to the pipeline's rights under the gas sales contract or
language may be inserted requiring the assignee to assume the con-
tractual obligations of the assignor. In such cases the sale is continued
by the assignee under the terms of the existing contract. The com-
mission has issued orders that denied the assignor's application re-
questing permission to abandon the existing sale. ' These orders state
'30 16 F.P.C. 1010, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 733 (1956). See also Order issued February 3, 1959,
In the Matter of Hope Producing Co., Docket No. G-15537, where the commission author-
ized the abandonment of a sale at 9.84 per Mcf. thereby permitting the producers to make
non-jurisdictional sale at 170 per Mcf.
... Orders issued March 18, 1958, In the Matters of Llano Grande Corp., Docket Nos.
G-13367, G-13450, and In the Matter of R. Olsen, Docket Nos. G-12310, G-12629, G-13112,
G-13113; Order issued March 7, 1958, In the Matter of Kenneth McCullogh, Docket Nos.
G-11701, G-11702. See order issued January 2, 1959, In the Matter of Great Sweet Grass
Oils Co., Docket No. G-15092.
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that the act does not require compliance with the provisions of sec-
tion 7 (b) since the identical service will be rendered by the assignee;
thus, the commission may simply rescind the former owner's cer-
tificate and issue a certificate to the new owner authorizing the exist-
ing sale. To be distinguished is the situation where the agreement be-
tween the parties changes the price of gas produced from the assigned
acreage; here compliance with section 7 (b) is required.' 3'
The provisions of section 7(b) may be necessary for the proper
administration of the act, but the stringent burden of proof imposed
upon producers should be relaxed to allow producers to terminate
certain sales. If a producer has the contractual right to terminate a
sale at a depressed price and another market is available at a price
which will permit the producer to avoid the abandonment of margin-
al wells, avoid flaring or venting, construct necessary facilities, work-
over wells, or develop fully the property, the commission should
permit the abandonment of the sale at a depressed price and authorize
the new sale, for the public interest demands the increased reserves
and the conservation of natural gas. Also, corrective measures are
badly needed in another area. Frequently a producer must execute a
short term contract to prevent flaring, drainage or the loss of leases.
The producer does not intend to dedicate his reserves to a specific pur-
chaser or such purchaser's market outlet, but the producer merely
needs a temporary market. Prices provided by these short term con-
tracts may be one-half the going field price available under a long
term contract. Federal regulation has forced these low price spot sales
off the interstate market; obviously this has destroyed a frequent




Since millions of dollars are required to construct the average inter-
state pipeline, the amortization on the large initial investment must
be spread over a considerable length of time; twenty years is con-
sidered to be the average amortization period for interstate pipelines.
Tremendous quantities of gas reserves must be committed to a
proposed pipeline before the project may be commenced since suffi-
cient reserves must be available initially to insure the operation of the
line during the amortization or pay-out period. It follows that large




reserves are necessary to attract bond purchasers, who supply the ma-
jor portion of the initial investment, and stockholders. Consequently,
gas purchase agreements are usually long term contracts which may
be made covenants running with the land or leasehold.
Since it is impossible to forecast the commodity value of natural
gas over a twenty year period, gas purchase contracts contain provi-
sions that allow the price to increase with the commodity value of the
product. Numerous clauses have been adopted which provide specific
price increases at certain fixed intervals or increases of an undeter-
mined amount that are contingent upon the occurance of future
events. Favored-nation and renegotiation clauses are the most common
of the latter type. Favored-nation clauses provide that the producer
will automatically receive an increased price if the buyer or another
pipeline pays a higher price to any producer that falls within a specific
classification or sells gas within a designated area. Renegotiation claus-
es provide that the parties will redetermine the contract price at a
specified date in accordance with the method prescribed by the agree-
ment. Spiral escalation clauses provide that the producer will receive
an increase in the field price when the transmission company receives
a rate increase. Further, most gas purchase contracts require the pur-
chaser to reimburse a designated portion of increases in severance,
gathering, and other similar taxes imposed upon the producer.
Provisions of this nature are necessary to maintain some relation-
ship between the contract price and the commodity value of natural
gas. A fifteen to twenty-year-old price bears no relationship to the
commodity value of natural gas today or current production and ex-
ploration costs. Unduly depressed prices will not support the type of
exploratory program which is required to maintain a healthy gas in-
dustry or provide sufficient revenue to develop reserves needed to re-
place present consumption. Furthermore, depressed prices result in
waste during a period in which conservation should be stressed. A
gas well may not be capable of production in "paying quantities"
when the production is sold at a price of 20 or 5 per Mcf., but a
price of 100 per Mcf. may prevent the loss of leases and permit the
production of a considerable volume of gas which would otherwise be
wasted. Similarly, a work-over may not be economically feasible or
further development of a field may not be advisable when the acre-
age is dedicated to the performance of a contract which provides an
unduly depressed price. Clearly, the public interest requires the con-
sideration of numerous factors in addition to the price which will be
paid by the ultimate consumer of natural gas. Under the present sys-
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tern of regulation, escalation provisions that bring the contractual
price up to commodity value are necessary to give the producers an
opportunity to come before the commission and justify that portion
of the contractual price which may be found to be just and reason-
able.
Nevertheless, the commission is presently conducting a proceeding
styled In the Matter of The Pure Oil Co.,133 in which one of the
principal issues is whether the "two-party favored nation" clauses in
Pure's contracts with El Paso Natural Gas Company are void or void-
able as contrary to the public interest. Moreover, El Paso Natural Gas
Company, an intervenor in the Pure case and the principal purchaser
in the Permian Basin, has recently filed a formal complaint against
all producers selling gas to El Paso in the Permian Basin. El Paso's
complaint is interrelated with the Pure case and requests, among
numerous other things, that the commission declare spiral escalation
clauses void as a matter of law.
B. Statutory Provisions
The rate provisions of the act are contained in sections 4 and 5.
Section 4(a) of the act provides that all rates and charges made,
demanded, or received by a natural gas company shall be "just and
reasonable" and declares rates which are not just and reasonable to be
unlawful. 3 ' Section 4(b) states that no natural gas company shall
grant any undue preference or advantage to any person, subject any
person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or maintain any un-
reasonable differences in rates either as between localities or classes of
service. 3' Section 4(c) requires every natural gas company to file
with the commission schedules showing all rates and charges for every
jurisdictional sale or transportation and the classifications, practices,
and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all
contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges,
classifications and services."'
Section 4(d) of the act denies natural gas companies the right to
change any rate, charge, classification, service, or contract relating
thereto, except after thirty days' notice to the commission and the
public. 3 ' This notice is given by filing with the commission a new
schedule stating the change or changes to be made in the existing
schedule and the effective date of the change. For good cause the com-
" Docket No. G-17930.
134 15 U.S.C.A. § 717c.(a) (1948).
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 717c.(b) (1948).
'3615 U.S.C.A. § 717c.(c) (1948).
137 15 U.S.C.A. § 717c.(d) (1948).
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mission may waive the thirty-day notice requirement. When a new
schedule is filed by a natural gas company, the commission is author-
ized by section 4(e) to enter upon a hearing to determine the law-
fulness of the new rate or charge and, pending such hearing and
decision, to suspend the operation and effectiveness of the new sched-
ule by giving notice to the natural gas company with a statement in
writing of the reasons for such suspension. The commission may not
suspend the new schedule for a longer period than five months be-
yond the time when the schedule would otherwise go into effect and
does not have the authority to suspend a rate applicable to the sale of
gas for resale for industrial use only. If the proceeding has not been
concluded and the final order issued at the expiration of the suspen-
sion period, the natural gas company may move to have the new rate,
charge, classification, or service become effective pending a final de-
termination of the matter. When the increased rate or charge is
made effective, the commission may require the natural gas company
to furnish bond to assure the refund with interest of any amount
which the commission, by its final decision, may find unjustified. In a
section 4 proceeding, the statute imposes the burden of proof upon
the natural gas company to show that the increased rate or charge is
just and reasonable.'
Section 5 (a) of the act provides that whenever the commission,
after a hearing instituted upon its own motion or upon complaint,
finds that any rate, charge or classification, or any rule, regulation,
practice or contract affecting such rate, charge or classification, is
unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the com-
mission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classifica-
tion, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed
and shall fix the same by order. The commission may order a decrease
in rate where existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, pre-
ferential or otherwise unlawful or when the existing rates are not the
lowest reasonable rates. The commission does not have the power,
however, to increase any rate contained in an effective rate schedule
unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule on file with
the commission."
The act therefore establishes two procedures to test the lawfulness
of a natural gas company's rates. The provisions of section 5 (a) apply
to all existing rates of the company under investigation and a pro-
ceeding under this section may be initiated upon the commission's
1 i5 U.S.C.A. 717c.(e) (1948).
13 f5 U.S.C.A. 5 717d.(a) (1948).
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own motion or upon complaint. The provisions of section 4 (d) and
(e) are only applicable to new rates and a section 4 proceeding may
only be instituted by the commission after a natural gas company
files a new schedule to change an existing rate. The act does not define
"just and reasonable" or prescribe any method for determining a
just and reasonable rate. It is the commission's duty to determine a
just and reasonable rate in both section 4 and section 5 proceedings,
but the proceedings arise and are conducted in a different manner.
Other provisions of the act grant broad powers to the commission
to enable it to enforce the rate provisions of the act. The commission
may, when necessary, initiate investigations to ascertain the actual
legitimate cost and depreciation of the property of every natural gas
company and to discover other facts which influence the determina-
tion of such cost or depreciation. 4' The commission may investigate
the cost of production and transportation of natural gas, even where
it has no authority to establish a rate governing the transportation or
sale of the particular gas involved. 4' The commission may also inves-
tigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which it may find
necessary or proper to (a) determine whether any person has violated,
or is about to violate, any provision of the act or any rule, regulation,
or order issued under the act; (b) prescribe rules and regulation; or
(c) obtain information to serve as a basis for recommending further
legislation to Congress.'42 The commission may ascertain and by order
fix proper and adequate rates of depreciation and amortization on
the several classes of property of each natural gas company.' Furth-
er, the commission may prescribe a system of accounts or a uniform
accounting procedure to be maintained by every natural gas com-
pany.
C. Changes In Rate
An initial rate becomes operative when the natural gas company's
rate schedule is accepted by the commission.' The initial rate is the
lawfully effective rate and the only rate the company is entitled to
collect until it is changed in the manner provided by the act. The
act provides two procedures for changing an effective rate and deter-
mining the lawfulness of a natural gas company's rates.
Section 5(a) prescribes a procedure which the commission may
initiate, upon complaint or its own motion, to determine the reason-
140 15 U.S.C.A. 5 717e.(a) (1948).
141 15 U.S.C.A. 5 717d.(b) (1948).
142 15 U.S.C.A. 5 717m.(a) (1948).
143 15 U.S.C.A. § 717h.(a) (1948).
144 15 U.S.C.A. § 717g.(a) (1948).
145Cf. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 35 U.S. 332 (1956).
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ableness of all rates of the party under investigation. A section 5 (a)
proceeding begins with a field investigation of the natural gas com-
pany by the commission's staff. During the investigation, the staff
compiles a record upon which the commission may make its ultimate
findings and conclusions and which the commission may use as the
basis for establishing reasonable rates. The burden of going forward
with the evidence and proving the unlawfulness of existing rates and
the reasonableness of the substituted rates is upon staff counsel.
The commission's investigation is not limited to a single sale or
several sales in a given area, but the commission may question the
reasonableness of all rates of the party under investigation applicable
to jurisdictional transactions. The commission is authorized to deter-
mine just and reasonable rates and to fix such rates by order as the
lawfully effective rates; the commission's power is prospective only
as section 5 (a) provides that such rates are "to be thereafter ob-
served." In the absence of a change proposed by the natural gas com-
pany, an existing or effective rate may only be modified after notice
and hearing in a section 5 (a) proceeding and after the commission
enters findings that the rate is unlawful."" A finding that a rate is
not just and reasonable has been said to be tantamount to a finding
that the rate is unlawful.
A proceeding may only be instituted under section 4 (e) of the act
when a natural gas company files a new schedule or a "notice of
change" pursuant to section 4 (d). Independent producers maintain a
rate schedule applicable to each jurisdictional sale; therefore, the
change in rates relates only to the sale or sales covered by the rate
schedule or schedules being changed under section 4(d). Section
4 (d) requires thirty days' notice to the commission and to the public.
If the parties attempt to change a rate without complying with the
notice provision of section 4(d), there is no valid change in rate.'47
Thus, in order to receive the increases on the date provided by the
gas sales contract, a producer must give notice or file a notice of
change a minimum of thirty days prior to the date the increase in
price is to become contractually effective.
Notice is given by filing a new schedule or a notice of change with
the commission setting forth the change or changes to be made in the
existing or effective schedule and the effective date of the change. If
the commission does not question the reasonableness of an increased
rate and does not suspend the effectiveness of the filing, the increased
146 See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., supra note 145; and the
authorities cited in footnote 173 infra.
.7 Cities Service Gas Producing Co. v. FPC, 233 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1956).
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rate automatically becomes effective at the end of the thirty-day
notice period or the date the increase is contractually due if the notice
of change is filed more than thirty days prior to the date provided by
by the contract. Should the commission question the reasonableness
of the increased rate, the effectiveness of the change will be suspended
and the use of the increased rate may be deferred for a period not ex-
ceeding five months beyond the effective date of the change. When a
notice of change is filed with the commission more than thirty days
prior to the proposed effective date, the decisions have held that the
commission may validly suspend the increased rate after the expiration
of thirty days so long as the suspension order is issued prior to the pro-
posed effective date. However, the commission may not suspend a
new schedule or notice of change after its effective date.14' The pipe-
line regulations provide that a rate cannot be changed during the
suspension period;45 although this rule has not been brought forward
in the producer regulations, the commission inserts a clause forbid-
ding such action in suspension orders directed to independent pro-
ducers.
If the section 4 (e) proceeding has not been concluded and the final
order issued at the expiration of the suspension period, the natural gas
company may move to have the new rate become effective, subject to
refund, pending the issuance of a final order by the commission. If
this procedure is followed, the commission may require a bond or a
corporate undertaking to insure the refund of any portion of the
increase which the commission may find unreasonable. Thus, the
commission may defer the use of an increased rate for a period of five
months, and, at the conclusion of the proceeding, it may assert its
rate-making powers retroactively by employing the refund procedure.
As a matter of practice, the commission has established a rate level
for each of the producing areas which it tentatively considers to be
the maximum reasonable rate. If a producer files a notice of change
to effectuate a rate lower than the area level, the commission will not
issue a suspension order and the increased rate will become effective
at the end of the thirty-day notice period. If the increased rate is
higher than the arbitrary area level, the commission issues an order
stating that the commission has found that the increased rate may
"" See sections 2.4 and 2.52 of Commission's General Policy and Interpretations, Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Part 11 (1958); Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568 (4th
Cir. 1953); Order issued May 6, 1959, In the Matter of Hassie Hunt Trust, Docket No.
G-17431, wherein the commission recognized that the statutory notice period commences
on the date of initial tender when the secretary unlawfully and erroneously rejects a notice
of change.
4 18 C.F.R. § 154.66(b) (1958 Supp.).
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not be just and reasonable and that the effectiveness of the increased
rate is suspended for five months.
It is highly improbable that the commission will conclude a section
4 (e) case within five months; therefore, it is necessary for the pro-
ducer to file a motion pursuant to section 4 (e) to have the increased
rate become effective subject to refund. If the producer fails to file
a motion prior to the expiration of the suspension period, the in-
creased rate will become effective, under the commission's present
policy on the date the motion is received by the commission; how-
ever, the validity of this policy has not been litigated.
After notice from the secretary of the commission, a hearing is
convened to determine the lawfulness of the increased rate; the com-
mission's sole concern in such proceeding is the reasonableness of the
increased rate. The burden of proof is upon the producer to prove
the reasonableness of the increased rate. If the increased rate is found
to be just and reasonable, the producer is entitled to retain all funds
collected at the increased rate, and the producer receives the increased
rate in the future. If the increased rate is found to be unlawful, the
producer must continue the sale at the previous rate or the rate estab-
lished by the commission's order and make refunds to the purchaser,
together with six per cent interest.
D. Rules And Regulations
Order 174, the first general order directed to independent produc-
ers and gatherers subsequent to the Phillips decision, compelled in-
dependent producers who were engaged in a jurisdictional transpor-
tation or sale on June 7, 1954 to file rate schedules with the commis-
sion setting forth the terms and conditions of each sale and service.
Order 174 froze all producer rates at the June 7, 1954 level; the
courts have upheld the validity of the commission's policy to con-
sider the producer's June 7, 1954 rate as an initial rate.'' ° Hence, the
June 7, 1954 rate became the lawfully effective rate, and this was
true even in those cases where the producer failed or refused to
comply with the order."' Increased rates which became effective on or
... Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 231 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1956); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. FPC, 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955).
'1 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Harrington, 246 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1957):
The failure to file it (rate schedule) earlier, however, did not prevent the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission from attaching .... There is nothing in the Natural Gas Act
or in the orders of the Federal Power Commission to indicate that, under such cir-
cumstances, until the rates were filed there was no effective or lawful rate. To the
contrary, the Act expressly provided for delay in such filings, and under the ra-
tionale of United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Corporation, supra, the contract
rate, even though unfiled, became and remained the only lawful rate until changed
by order of the Federal Power Commission. 246 F.2d at 919.
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before June 7, 1954 pursuant to the terms of an escalation provision
were effective rates, and such increased rates were not subject to the
commission's suspension power. '
The commission attempted to establish the rule that the June 7,
1954 rate is the price actually received by the producer on such date,
but, in at least one instance, the commission considered the intention
of the parties to determine the June 7, 1954 rate.153 Several decisions
have held that the commission has exclusive jurisdiction over rate
matters, and it, therefore, possesses the authority to construe gas sales
contracts to determine the June 7, 1954 rate.154 The revised opinion
rendered in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC'5' follows this line of cases,
holding that the producer's June 7, 1954 rate, or initial rate for reg-
ulatory purposes, was the correct and effective price on June 7, 1954,
under the terms of the gas sales contract. Thus, the provisions of the
contract were controlling, not the price actually received on this date
or set forth in the billing determinant.15
Prior to the Phillips decision the courts upheld state statutes which
established a minimum price for natural gas as a conservation meas-
ure, 157 but, as a result of the Phillips case, these minimum price stat-
utes have been declared invalid.5 " Consequently, a June 7, 1954 rate
which was established by an unlawful order of a state agency is not the
lawfully effective rate on such date, but the producer's initial rate is
the contractual rate which was to be in effect on such date."' How-
ever, several producers involved in pending litigation are contending
... Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, supra note 1SO.
113 See Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 263 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir. 1959).
14 See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955); Trunkline Gas
Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1957); State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206 F.2d 690
(8th Cir. 1953); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Willmut Gas & Oil Co., 231 Miss. 700,
97 So. 2d 530, 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 109 (1957).
155258 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1958). See also Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc. v. FPC
260 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1958).
156 The Court held that it was within the jurisdiction of the commission to determine
whether a revised and corrected billing statement filed by the producer should be accepted,
and, as an incident of such jurisdiction, to determine the correct rate in effect on June 7,
1954. The Court rejected the commission's contention that the rate actually being paid on
June 7, 1954, is controlling for regulatory purposes, and the Court concluded that the con-
tractual rate was the lawfully effective rate. Thus, the rate reflected by the billing deter-
minant filed with the producer's rate schedule or the rate actually received by the pro-
ducer on June 7, 1954, may not be the producer's initial rate, but such rate is the
"correct and effective price" on June 7, 1954, under the terms of the gas sales contract.
"7 Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State
Corp. Comm'n, 169 Kan. 722, 222 P.2d 704 (1950).
... Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n, 355 U.S. 391 (1958);
Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 355 U.S. 425 (1958); Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955); Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of America v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1958).
... Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FPC, supra note 158.
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that the minimum price orders have become a part of the gas sales
contracts and that they are not void ab initio, but merely voidable.
When a producer intends to enter into a new sale or service, he is
required to file a rate schedule not less than thirty days nor more than
ninety days prior to the proposed date of initial deliveries or services,
provided that the regulations require him to make certificate and
rate filings."' The producer's rate filing should state the date upon
which the proposed sale or service is to be commenced, and a sample
billing must be attached to show the estimated volume deliverable
during the first month of service, the method of billing, and the
prices charged. If an independent producer transports or sells less
than 100,000 Mcf. of natural gas annually in jurisdictional transac-
tions, he may file a statement in lieu of a rate schedule. 6 '
The commission does not require independent producers to com-
pile and file tariffs, as in the case of transmission companies, but the
rules and regulations define a producer's rate schedule as ". . . the
basic contract and all supplements or agreements amendatory there-
of, effective and applicable on and after June 7, 1954 showing the
service to be provided and the rates and charges, terms, conditions,
classifications, practices, rules, and regulations affecting or relating to
such rates or changes, applicable to the transportation ... or the sale
of natural gas . . ,,."" In the event a producer is making a jurisdic-
tional sale or transportation under an oral agreement, the agreement
must be reduced to writing and filed with the commission. If the
parties are not able to agree on the terms of the oral agreement, the
producer files a statement of his understanding of the agreement and
serves a copy on the purchaser, and the purchaser may subsequently
file his version of the agreement. 'sa
Independent producers are denied the right to collect any rate in
excess of the June 7, 1954 rate, or, if the rate schedule became effec-
tive after such date, the initial rate, unless the producer has complied
with the provisions of section 4 of the act. The regulations provide
that no change in rates or charges for any jurisdictional sale or service
shall be made by an independent producer subsequent to June 7, 1954
without filing a "notice of change" pursuant to section 4(d) of the
act not less than thirty days nor more than ninety days prior to the
proposed effective date." ' The regulations define a "change in rate
0' As previously discussed, the regulations require certain producers to make filings,
deny certain producers the right to maintain rate schedules, and grant certain producers
an election to comply or to refrain from complying with the regulations.
's 18 C.F.R. S 154.92 (1958 Supp.).
162 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1958 Supp.).
63 18g C.F.R. 5 154.95 (1958 Supp.).
z18 C.F.R. § 154.94(a)(b) (1958 Supp.).
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schedule" as the "operation of any provision of the rate schedule
providing for future or periodic changes in rate, charge, classification
or service after June 7, 1954 or the operation of any like provision
in any initial rate schedule filed after June 7, 1954 . . . ."' Thus, a
price increase, which becomes effective subsequent to June 7, 1954
under the provisions of a contract executed prior to June 7, 1954, is
a "change" within the purview of section 4 of the act.
The producer's notice of change must contain the reasons, nature,
and basis for the change in rate, the date the change is to become ef-
fective, and a comparative statement which shows the financial im-
pact of the new rate upon the purchaser."' Also, the producer must
submit a full statement in support of his filing if the change results
in an increased rate or charge.16 If the producer transports or sells
less than 100,000 Mcf. of natural gas annually, subject to the com-
mission's jurisdiction, the producer may file a statement in lieu of
the usual notice of change.'
When a producer intends to cancel or terminate a rate schedule, in
whole or in part, and no new rate schedule is to be filed in its place,
the producer must notify the commission of the proposed cancellation
or termination at least thirty days prior to the date such action is
contemplated. A statement indicating the reasons for the cancellation
or termination must be submitted with the notice.""
E. Relationship Between The Act And Contractual Rights
Rates and contracts which conflict with the act must yield.' This
does not mean the Natural Gas Act sets aside contractual relationships
established by the parties; to the contrary, the act contemplates the
initial relationship between the parties to be set by contract, with
review of the agreement by the commission to protect the public
interest. On review the commission may determine the "just and
reasonable" rate and establish it as the lawfully effective rate. Similar-
ly, there is authority which states that the commission may modify
other contractual provisions which are found to be contrary to the
public interest.' The commission's rate powers are prospective only;
16118 C.F.R. § 154.94(c) (1958 Supp.).
566 18 C.F.R. § 154.94(e) (1958 Supp.).
1 7 i8 C.F.R. § 154.94(f) (1958 Supp.).
1 8 18 C.F.R. § 154.94(g) (1958 Supp.).
169 18 C.F.R. § 154.97 (1958 Supp.).
176 Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 226 F.2d 60 (6th
Cir. 1955); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Memphis Natural Gas Co., 162 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1947); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 142 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1944);
Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 121 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1941).
171 See Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 252 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Michigan
Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., supra note 170.
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newly determined rates can only apply in the future. "' Previously
accepted rates may be modified by the commission only after notice,
hearing, and the issuance of an order based upon findings of fact and
conclusions of law supported by substantial evidence."3
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp." is the
leading case in this area. The Mobile case presented to the court a fac-
tual situation in which the transmission company sold gas to a dis-
tributing company for resale to an industrial consumer under a con-
tract which provided a specific price."' By a section 4(d) filing
United attempted to increase the rate charged Mobile to an amount
which exceeded the contractual price. Mobile petitioned the commis-
sion to reject United's filing, but the commission refused to do so,
holding it did not have the authority to suspend an industrial rate.
Therefore, the increased rate became effective at the expiration of the
thirty-day notice period. Suit was then brought by Mobile for restitu-
tion of the excess charges resulting from the rate increase.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, United contended that
the act set forth two distinct procedures to effect a rate change, argu-
ing that the commission may find that existing rates are unreasonable
and order rate changes after notice and hearing in a section 5 proceed-
ing, or that the natural gas company may effect a unilateral change
in rates under the provisions of section 4. If the latter procedure is
followed, United contended that the commission's sole concern is the
reasonableness of the increased rate. The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the pipline's arguments by holding that section 4 (d) of the
act does not prescribe circumstances under which a change may be
made but merely prohibits a change without proper notice to the
commission. Since the act contained references to contracts and did
not expressly authorize a unilateral change by either party, the Court
"Cities Service Gas Producing Co. v. FPC, 233 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1956); State
Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 215 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1954).
13See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717c.(e), 717d.(a), 717r.(b) (1948); Colorado-Wyoming Gas
Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 626 (1945); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Co., supra note 170; Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 899 (3rd Cir. 1953);
State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953); Mississippi River Fuel Corp.
v. FPC, 163 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, supra
note 170.
174 350 U.S. 332 (1956). See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FPC, supra note
158; Tyler Gas Service Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
... Transmission companies sell natural gas under contracts which prescribe a specific
price and standard tariff agreements which set the contractual price at the rate allowed the
transmission company by the Federal Power Commission or a state regulatory agency. Trans-
mission companies file for increases in rates under section 4 (d) when existing rates do not
provide sufficient revenue to meet increasing expenses. Prior to the Mobile case, some trans-
mission companies increased the rates of all customers by such procedure whether the agree-
ment between the parties was a standard tariff agreement or a contract prescribing a specific
price.
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concluded that the act definitely contemplated certain rates set by
private contract. "To find in the section a further purpose to em-
power natural gas companies to change their contracts unilaterally,"
the Court said, "requires reading into it language that is neither there
nor reasonably to be implied..... Thus, the basic scheme of the Natural
Gas Act is to permit rates to be determined in the first instance by
natural gas companies by contract or otherwise,7 and a natural gas
company must be contractually entitled to the increased rate or its
unilateral rate filing must be rejected by the commission. In accord
with the Mobile case is Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC,17s in which it is
stated that the act "recognizes the right of the parties to set rates by
individual contract and abrogates none of the usual contract rights
except for the reviewing powers granted the commission upon
hearing.1'7
Although the Court refused to allow a unilateral change under
section 4 (d) in the Mobile case, it suggested that a party contractual-
ly bound at an unreasonably low rate apply to the commission under
section 14 (a) of the act... and request that the commission initiate a
section 5 (a) investigation. In the event the commission investigates
176 350 U.S. at 341. The Court clarified the powers of the commission under sections 4
and 5 as follows:
The powers of the Commission are defined by §§ 4 (e) and 5 (a). The basic power
of the Commission is that given it by 5S (a) to set aside and to modify any rate or
contract which it determines, after hearing, to be 'unjust, unreasonable, unduly dis-
criminatory, or preferential.' This is neither a 'rate-making' nor a 'rate changing' pro-
cedure. It is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the first instance
by natural gas companies and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy them.
Section 5 (a) would of its own force apply to all the rates of a natural gas com-
pany, whether long established or newly changed, but in the latter case the power is
further implemented by § 4 (e). All that S 4 (e) does, however, is to add to this
basic power, in the case of a newly changed rate or contract (except 'industrial' rates),
the further powers (1) to preserve the status quo pending review of the new rate by
suspending its operation for a limited period, and (2) thereafter to make its order
retroactive, by means of the refund procedure, to the date the change became effective.
The Mobile opinion contains strong language regarding the contractual relationship of
the parties:
We should bear in mind that it (the Act) evidences no purpose to abrogate private
rate contracts as such. To the contrary, by requiring contracts to be filed with the
Commission, the Act expressly recognizes that rates to particular customers may be
set by individual contracts. . . . The Natural Gas Act permits the relations between
the parties to be established by contract, the protection of the public interest being af-
forded by supervision of the individual contracts, which to that end must be filed
with the Commission and made public.
... United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., supra note 145; FPC v. Sierra
Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956); Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 860 (10th
Cir. 1958); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 170.
178 Supra note 177.
17 255 F.2d at 864. See the Mobile opinion, 350 U.S. at 343, where the Court states that
the "obvious implication is that, except as specifically limited by the Act, the rate making
powers of natural gas companies were to be no different from those they would possess in the
absence of the Act. .... .
180 15 U.S.C.A. § 717m.(a) (1948).
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the natural gas company and finds the depressed price is unjust and
unreasonable, the Court held that the commission could permit the
company to file a schedule increasing the depressed rate; thus, the
commission may allow an increase in rate when such action is required
by the public interest. The standard which must be met before a rate
increase is authorized under this procedure was stated in FPC v.
Sierra Pacific Power Co."8' The Sierra case, a companion to the Mobile
case, arose under the Federal Power Act, which contains procedural
provisions very similar to those in the Natural Gas Act. The language
employed by the Supreme Court in the Sierra opinion establishing the
standard is as follows:
While it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon
a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair return, it
does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree by contract
to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it does so, it is en-
titled to be relieved of its improvident bargain. . . . In such circum-
stances the sole concern of the Commission would seem to be whether
the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest-as where it
might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its
service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly
discriminatory."' s
When an increase is provided for by contract (i.e., is bilateral rath-
er than unilateral) the natural gas company must give notice to the
commission and the public, and the commission may institute a section
4(e) proceeding against the company to determine the reasonable-
ness of the increased rate. It is generally conceded that the order is-
sued at the conclusion of a section 4(e) proceeding may establish,
as the lawfully effective rate, any amount between the previous rate
and the new rate but that the commission may not impose upon the
natural gas company a rate that is less than the previous rate. How-
ever, two commissioners have construed certain language in the
Mobile case to mean that the commission could find that a rate lower
than the previous or existing rate is the just and reasonable rate and
establish the lesser rate as the lawfully effective rate."'
'81 350 U.S. 348 (1956). See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 267 F.2d 165 (D.C.
Cir. 1959).
182 350 U.S. at 355.
... Commissioners Digby and Steuke dissenting, In the Matter of Union Oil Company of
California, 16 F.P.C. 100, 115 (1956):
We believe that the Commission's responsibility under Section 4 of the Natural Gas
Act in a rate proceeding such as this is to find and determine a lawful rate and that
this lawful rate might be anything not greater than the rate requested in the appli-
cant's filing. The only control over the Commission's authority in determining the law-
ful rate is the injunction that the rate shall not be greater than that requested by the
applicants. We take the position that even the starting price under the contract is
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Several producers have contended that the Mobile and Sierra opin-
ions held that gas sales contracts are indivisible. Under this interpre-
tation, an increase in price provided by a price escalation provision in
the initial contract would not constitute a "change" in rates, and the
natural gas company would automatically be entitled to the increased
rate without complying with the provisions of section 4(d). Com-
missioners have, at times, supported this interpretation; however, the
majority has uniformly held that periodic escalations and other in-
creases constitute a "change" in rate within the purview of section
4 (d) and are subject to suspension under section 4 (e) although such
increases are provided by the basic contract of sale."s" This question
was presented in Episcopal Theological Seminary of the Southwest v.
FPC. " The court held that the contractual provisions cannot modify
the regulatory provisions of the Act and an increase in price under
an escalation clause is a change in rate within the purview of section
4 (d). The opinion states:
To approve escalation clauses in long term contracts when the contracts
were originally filed, would determine rates for indefinite future periods.
Fair adjustments of escalation-clause rates to future costs and earnings
would be impossible at that time. Public utility rates cannot be fixed
solely by bargaining between producers and distributors. The govern-
mental agency also has the duty to protect the consumer.8 6
The courts have held that periodic escalations, favored nation in-
creases, and increases resulting from amendatory agreements are rate
"changes" which require notice to the commission before they may
become effective."8 7 Furthermore, when a producer enters into a com-
pletely new gas sales contract upon the expiration of the initial con-
not controlling as a minimum lawful rate.
This dissenting opinion should be considered with the following language in the
Mobile case:
It [a rate proposed by a natural gas company] is thus no more a "proposed" rate than
any other rate, all of which are equally subject to Commission review. Likewise, no
"proceeding" is initiated by a § 4 (d) filing. A proceeding to review the new rate
may be initiated under § 4 (e), but, if so, it is initiated by the Commission in the
same manner as a proceeding under § 5 (a) to review any other rate, that is, upon
complaint or its own motion. The only difference is the interim suspension power
given by S 4 (e), but that in no way affects the character of the proceeding, which
remains, like a § 5 (a) proceeding, simply a review by the Commission of a rate
established by the natural gas company. [350 U.S. at 342-43.]
84 In the Matter of Forest Oil Corp., 17 F.P.C. 586 (1957); In the Matter of Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 17 F.P.C. 39 (1957); In the Matter of Crow Drilling Co., 17 F.P.C. 226
(1956); In the Matter of Sun Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 174 (1956); In the Matter of Union Oil
Co. 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956).




Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1958); Cities Service Gas Producing Co. v. FPC, supra note 172;
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Memphis Natural Gas Co., supra note 170; Mississippi River
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tract, the second contract is a "change in rate schedule," and it does
not prescribe a separate and distinct "sale" of natural gas. Conse-
quently, the price provided by the new contract is not an initial rate,
and the increase in rate is subject to suspension." '
After the Mobile decision the commission concluded that increases
invoked under a standard tariff agreement are not unilateral increases
and that ex parte filings pursuant to section 4(d) of the act are not
subject to attack as being contrary to the Mobile doctrine."' The
validity of the commission's ruling was questioned in Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. FPC,"' and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside an order of the com-
mission which, in effect, held that such changes are bilateral."1'
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in United Gas
Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas &q Water Div."" The Court re-
viewed the provisions of section 4 and concluded that it contains
nothing which implies that the parties must agree to a specific price
before a filing may be made under section 4 (d). The Court reviewed
the Mobile case and distinguished it, deciding that United was free,
under the tariff agreement, to change its rates from time to time, sub-
ject to the procedures and limitations of the act. Further, the opinion
states:
Mobile makes it plain that § 4 (d) on its face indicates no more than
that otherwise valid changes cannot be put into effect without giving
the required notice to the Commission .... The necessary corollary of
this proposition is that changes which in fact are 'otherwise valid' in
the light of the relationship between the parties can be put into effect
under § 4 (d) by a seller through giving the required notice to the
Commission. Mobile expressly notes that in the absence of any contrac-
tual relationship rates determined ex parte by the seller may be filed
under § 4 (d). 350 U.S., at 343. We perceive no tenable basis of dis-
tinction between the filing of such a rate in the absence of contract and
a similar filing under an agreement which explicitly permits it."'
Fuel Corp. v. FPC, supra note 170.
'"Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1959).
"' In the Matter of United Gas Pipeline Co., 16 F.P.C. 10, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 758 (1956);
In the Matter of United Gas Pipeline Co., 16 F.P.C. 19 (1956).
'0250 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
.". The basic question presented to the court was whether a tariff agreement provides the
consent required by the Mobile case. The court distinguished between a consent to a rate
filing and consent to a specific rate and held that the tariff agreement constituted the pur-
chaser's consent to the filing but not that particular rate. The Mobile case was construed to
mean that the parties to the contract must agree to a specific price; therefore, this decision
required the commission to reject any rate filing which is not in accordance with the agree-
ment of the parties or which sets forth a rate that is not specifically provided by the agreement.
"2 358 U.S. 103 (1958). See Nevada Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 267 F.2d 405
(5th Cir. 1959).
153358 U.S. at 112-13.
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Dicta in the Supreme Court's CATCO decision'" follows the above
quoted language. The CATCO case involved independent producers,
not pipelines. The opinion states that the producer ". . . although to
this extent a captive subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, is
not without remedy to protect himself. He may, unless otherwise
bound by contract . . . file new rate schedules with the Commis-
sion."'" Therefore, it may be assumed that the court has endorsed
ex parte filings by independent producers. A producer may appar-
ently file ex parte under section 4(d) to increase a rate to any level
within the realm of reason when the producer is not contractually
obligated to accept a lower rate and the filing does not abrogate an
enforceable agreement.
F. Method Of Rate Regulation
1. The Rate Base Method
Although several successful methods have been developed to estab-
lish and evaluate public utility rates, the "rate base method" is the
traditional method and judicial means used to determine and test a
"just and reasonable" rate as required by the Natural Gas Act. The
rate base method was first applied to the natural gas industry in
Newark Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Newark.'"
Basically the rate base method seeks to permit the natural gas com-
pany to receive from its customers sufficient funds to meet its ex-
penses and to allow a moderate return upon the investment employed
to serve the public. The rate base is a figure representing the money
invested in equipment and properties necessary or useful for fulfill-
ment of the service requirements of the utility plus an allowance for
working capital. To determine the return allowed the natural gas
company, the rate of return (a percentage) is multiplied by the rate
base. All expenditures that are necessary and proper to supply the
required services or goods, including taxes and depreciation, are al-
lowable expenses. The amount of revenue which the natural gas com-
pany is entitled to receive is determined by adding the return and all
allowable expenses. The goods furnished or services rendered are then
charged proportionately to realize the necessary revenue.
When a natural gas company is engaged in several types of busi-
ness, only a part of which is subject to the jurisdiction of the com-
mission, some separation of property, capital, expenses, and revenue
is essential to confine the federal regulation to the jurisdictional func-
'"4Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
'
95 Id. at 385.
"6 242 U.S. 405 (1917). Several cases, none of which pertained to natural gas or a simi-
lar irreplacable commodity, were cited to support this decision.
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tions of the company. The commission must segregate the jurisdic-
tional from the non-jurisdictional business or employ a suitable alloca-
tion formula adapted to the particular circumstances. The commis-
sion is given much discretion in the selection of the allocation formula
since it is exercising a legislative function. When the commission uses
a particular allocation formula, the courts are not warranted in re-
jecting the formula which the commission employs unless it plainly
contravenes the statutory scheme of regulation.""
Some authorities advocate the fluctuation of the rate of return with
the demand for capital.' The use of this "cost of capital" approach
may be appropriate when considering a business which is financed by
the sale of stock and long term bonds; but the average independent
producer primarily depends upon the reinvestment of its earnings,
the sale of oil payments, and occasionally the sale of producing prop-
erties to finance expenses which would normally be considered capital
expenditures, e.g., the acquisition of property and the maintenance
of an active exploratory program. Therefore, it is submitted that the
cost of capital approach should not be employed to establish the pro-
ducers' rate of return due to the lack of debt or equity financing. The
criterion announced in Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v.
Public Service Commission' and set forth below is believed by the
writer to be the correct one.
What annual rate will constitute just compensation depends upon
many circumstances and must be determined by the exercise of a fair
and enlightened judgment, having regard to all relevant facts. A public
utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the
value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the pub-
lic equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same
general part of the country on investments in other business undertak-
ings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it
has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated
in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return
should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and
economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable
197 See Colorado-Wyoming Gas. Co. v. FPC, supra note 173; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635 (1945); State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, supra note 173;
Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 203 F.2d 494 (3rd Cir. 1953); Mississippi
River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 163 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC,
155 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1946); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 170.
log See, e.g., Morton, Rate of Return and the Value of Money in Public Utilities, 28 Land
Econ. 91 (1952).
"'9262 U.S. 679 (1923). See Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909);
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1908); In the Matter of Natural Gas Pipe
Line Co., 2 F.P.C. 218 (1940).
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it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public
duties.""°
The Bluefield approach presupposes that the risks are not highly
speculative and the business is non-competitive. The gas producing
business is both speculative and competitive. The Bluefield rationale,
however, would permit the regulated independent producer to receive
a return comparable to the profit received by a similar, successful,
non-regulated producing company, thus taking into account the risks
inherent in the producing industry. Should the commission fail to
make appropriate allowances for such risks, sufficient revenue will
not be generated to maintain active and effective exploratory pro-
grams, and the inevitable result will be the discovery and develop-
ment of insufficient reserves to supply the growing domestic, com-
mercial, and industrial markets of this country.
2. Transportation Rate Cases
Nineteen years prior to the Newark Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v.
City of Newark decision' the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames. 2 had been
stated. Smyth v. Ames held that a utility is entitled to a return upon
the "fair value" of that which it employs for the public convenience.
Thus, the rate base would constitute a figure representing the present
value of the property necessary and useful to perform the required
service to the public.
The first decision to upset the "fair value" determination of Smyth
v. Ames substantially arose under the Natural Gas Act. In FPC v.
Natural Gas Pipe Line Co.,"3 the commission's staff computed the
rate base on the basis of reproduction cost, but the depreciation base
was computed at actual cost plus estimated future capital additions.
The staff's evidence resulted in a finding that the existing rates of the
company were unjust, unreasonable, and excessive. The United States
Court of Appeals vacated the commission's order, but the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the commission. The
Supreme Court's majority opinion held that there is a "zone of rea-
sonableness" within which the commission is free to act and that the
commission was authorized by section 5 (a) of the act to decrease any
rate which was not the lowest reasonable rate. The majority further
stated that the courts are without authority to set aside as too low
any reasonable rate adopted by the commission which is consistent
with constitutional requirements. The constitutional requirements
200 262 U.S. at 692.
201 Supra note 196.
202 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
203315 U.S. 575 (1942).
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were said to coincide with the statutory requirements. The majority
opinion concluded: "The Constitution does not bind rate-making
bodies to the service of any single formula or combination of for-
mulas. Agencies to whom this legislative power has been delegated are
free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the
pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular
circumstances." '  Although the majority opinion did not expressly
overrule Smyth v. Ames, the previous doctrine of rate-making was
effectively repudiated. The minority opinion of Justices Black, Doug-
las, and Murphy"0 ' went further and advocated the abolition of the
"fair value" determination of Smyth v. Ames.
Confident of its position because of the language used by the Court
in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. opinions, the commission subsequent-
ly ascertained the rate base upon the basis of actual cost. The validity
of this policy was tested in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co."' Hope
Natural Gas Company, a West Virginia corporation, produced and
purchased natural gas in West Virginia and sold gas to West Virginia
customers, but the bulk of Hope's sales were to three affiliate and
two non-affiliate distributing companies in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Several cases involving the reasonableness of Hope's rates were con-
solidated for hearing. In the preparation of its case the commission's
staff computed the rate base, depletion, and depreciation upon the
basis of actual legitimate cost; Hope advocated the use of reproduc-
tion cost or trended original cost. The commission approved the
staff's method. The eight per cent rate of return proposed by the
company was found to be unreasonable, and six and one-half per cent
was declared to be a fair rate of return. The six and one-half per cent
rate of return applied to the rate base, computed upon actual legiti-
mate cost, produced a return of $2,191,314 annually, which was less
than one-half of the company's annual earnings of approximately
$5,801,171. The commission ordered a reduction in rates consistent
with its findings, and the company appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals set aside the commission's
order primarily upon the theory that the rate base should have
been computed on the basis of present fair value rather than actual
204 Id. at 586. The Court also upheld the commission's computation of the amortization
base on the basis of actual cost, stating that it was an expense item and that any allowance
in excess of cost would constitute an additional profit over and above a fair return.
... The minority interpreted the decision of the majority to mean that the "Commission
may now adopt, if it chooses, prudent investment [determining reasonable rates in compari-
son with the cost of rendering the required service under prudent management] as a rate
base" and "there could be no constitutional objection if the Commission adhered to that
formula and rejected all others." 315 U.S. at 606.
206320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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legitimate cost. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of
appeals and sustained the commission's order. The Supreme Court's
opinion states:
The Commission was not bound to the use of any single formula or
combination of formulas in determining rates. Its rate-making function,
moreover, involves the making of 'pragmatic adjustments'. . . . When
the Commission's order is challenged in the courts, the question is
whether the order 'viewed in its entirety' meets the requirements of the
Act .... Under the statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the
result reached not the method employed which is controlling. . . . If
the total effect of the rate order can not be said to be unjust and un-
reasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. . . . It [the
order] is the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption
of validity. And he who would upset the rate order under the Act
carries the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is
invalid. .. ."' (Emphasis added.)
Further, the Court held that the function of the rate-making
process is to balance the investor and consumer interests. Thus, there
must be sufficient revenue for capital costs as well as operating ex-
penses. These capital costs include interest on the debt and dividends
to stockholders commensurate with those paid shareholders in enter-
prises having corresponding risks. The return should be sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, thereby
permitting the company to maintain its credit and attract capital.
Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain
its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its inves-
tors for the risks may be just and reasonable even though such rates
produce only a meager return on the fair value of the property dedi-
cated to the public service.
Since the Hope case fair value is no longer deemed an essential
ingredient of an economic rate base; fair value is the end product
and not the means of the rate-making process.'0 ' The commission is
given much discretion in the selection of the method used to test
and fix rates so long as the overall end result is fair, just, and equi-
table to all parties. Thus rate-making was transformed into price-
fixing whereby the regulatory agency determines rates by consider-
ing all economic factors and makes "pragmatic adjustments" to reach
a reasonable result. Therefore, the commission may consider the uni-
que features of each case and make adjustments without complying
with any accepted standard to normalize the result, which, of course,
could constitute arbitrary action.
207Id. at 602.
20 Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, supra note 197, at 701.
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. FPC,5 9 for the Court held that rate-making is essentially
a legislative function, and, when Congress fails to provide a formula
for the commission to follow, the courts are not warranted in reject-
ing the formula adopted by the commission unless it plainly con-
travenes the statutory scheme of regulation. The Court upheld the
commission's use of the rate base method and, of more importance,
refused to deny the commission the authority to depart from the rate
base method.
Since the Hope case, the commission has consistently employed the
rate base method and computed the rate base at cost. 1 On the au-
thority of the Hope, Natural Gas Pipeline Co., and Colorado Inter-
state cases, however, it is assumed that the commission may use a
method other than the rate base method even though the other meth-
od would produce a higher rate.
The decisions unanimously reflect that the problems of rate-
making are to be decided by the administrative experts, not the courts,
and one Supreme Court decision questions the ability of inferior
courts to consider the questions involved. 1' The decisions rendered to
date permit the commission to use original cost, prudent investment,
fair value, reproduction cost, reasonable value, book value, or any
combination of methods in establishing the rate base and in making
other valuations which must necessarily be made when the rate base
method is used.
3. Natural Gas Rate Cases-Field Sales
a. Pipeline Cases.-In the Hope case the company's investment in
producing properties was included in the rate base for a reasonable
return in accordance with the traditional method. Since Hope's argu-
ment rested upon the use of reproduction or trended original cost
as the method of ascertaining the rate base, there was no objection
to the inclusion of this class of property in the rate base. Mr. Justice
Jackson's opinion, however, emphasized the fact that Hope was en-
gaged in two divergent types of business. According to this opinion,
the rate base method would be reasonably satisfactory for the trans-
portation phase of Hope's business, but improper for the production
phase since the price of gas, when captured, bears little relation to
209324 U.S. 581 (1945).
... The commission on one occasion abandoned the rate base method, but was reversed by
the circuit court. City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Even this de-
cision, however, contains language which indicates that the commission may employ other
methods.
...FPC v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492 (1955).
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the cost of tools, supplies, and labor required to develop the reserves....
The question of whether the commission should allow a transmis-
sion company the fair field value of gas produced by its wells as an
operating expense or whether the pipeline's investment in producing
properties should be included in the rate base for the traditional re-
turn was first presented to the Supreme Court in Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. FPC."' The Court upheld the commission's use of the rate
base method to establish the pipeline's allowance for gas produced by
the pipeline and transported in its own system. The Court concluded
that the production and gathering exemption of section 1 (b) of the
act did not prevent the commission from including the company's
investment in production facilities in the rate base for the traditional
return and that the end result was just and reasonable." 4 Thus trans-
mission companies, which are also in the production business, were
denied the right to receive, as an expense item, an amount com-
mensurate to the commodity value of its production or the average
price received by independent producers in the field; only a moder-
ate return was allowed despite the risks incident to the production
business.
The dissenting opinion of Justices Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter and
Chief Justice Stone states that the commission should not be permit-
ted to integrate producing properties in the rate base or apply the
standards of valuation applicable to the transportation business. This
opinion relies upon the legislative history of the act and the clarity
of section 1 (b). Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion reaffirmed his previous
position in the Hope case. The record disclosed that five leases con-
sisting of approximately 47,000 acres were included in the rate base
at $4,244.24, and three leases were included at zero. Thus, property
which had an estimated market value of over three million dollars was
allowed an annual return of less than three hundred dollars. This, Mr.
Justice Jackson said, was a "fantastic" method of establishing a just
and reasonable price for natural gas." '1
After regulating the price of natural gas produced by pipelines for
many years in accordance with the method approved by the Colorado
Interstate case, the commission reversed its policy in In the Matter of
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co."'" The producing properties of the
pipeline were excluded from the rate base, and the transmission com-
212 320 U.S. at 628-60.
213 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
214See pp. 431-32 supra.
21' 324 U.S. at 610-11.




pany was allowed the weighted average field price for gas which it
produced as an operating expense. In reaching its decision the com-
mission reviewed prior Supreme Court decisions and concluded that
it was free to adopt a method other than the rate base method. The
commission found that this change was necessary for the following
reasons: (1) the use of the rate base method resulted in an arbitrarily
depressed price which accelerated consumption and failed to encour-
age the necessary discovery and development; and (2) it is in the
public interest that transmission companies remain in the business of
producing natural gas, and during the period the rate base method
had been employed production by these companies had declined con-
siderably.
The Panhandle Eastern case was styled City of Detroit v. FPC'17
on review. The City of Detroit opinion states that section 5 (a) does
not mean that rates which are not the lowest reasonable rates cannot
also be just and reasonable and that section 5 (a) "permits but does
not compel the Commission to go to the very limit of constitutional
power." '18 The court conceded that the commission had the power to
depart from the traditional rate base method, but explained that the
principal purpose of the act was to protect consumers against ex-
ploitation at the hands of natural gas companies. Admitting the rel-
evance of the two factors emphasized by the commission and recog-
nizing their importance, the court held that the proceedings did not
show the resulting increase in rates was no greater than reasonably
necessary for the purposes advanced. The opinion further states:
If the Commission contemplates increasing rates . . . it must see to it
that the increase is in fact needed, and is no more than is needed. ...
It is essential in such a case as this that it (the rate base method) be
used as a basis of comparison .... Unless it is continued to be used at
least as a point of departure, the whole experience under the Act is
discarded. . .. "'
Even though the commission finds that a natural gas company needs
additional revenue as an incentive to explore for and produce natural
gas, this case requires the commission to test the increased rate by
the rate base method, as well as the other method adopted by the
commission, to be sure that the rate allowed is no more than necessary
to provide such incentive. As a result of the City of Detroit case the
commission has taken the position that producers must use the rate
base method to prove the reasonableness of their rates unless there is
217 Supra note 210.
21
8 Id. at 815.
19 Id. at 818-19.
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a showing that unusual circumstances prevent the use of such method
or serious complications will arise if such method is employed.
Prior to Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC,'20 the unregulated field
price received by a regulated pipeline company from the sale of its
production to another pipeline was not subject to the commission's
regulation, and funds received from such sales were non-jurisdictional
income provided they were at arm's length. This was true even if
the purchaser was a regulated interstate pipeline and the production
was transported or sold in interstate commerce for resale by the pur-
chasing pipeline. Independent producers also established their prices
by contracts which were not subject to review by the commission
prior to the Phillips case. However, where a producer or pipeline sold
gas to an affiliated company and the purchaser transported or sold
such gas in interstate commerce for resale, the commission could
pierce the corporate veil and regulate the inter-affiliate sale. The trans-
action did not necessarily have to be between a parent corporation
and a wholly owned subsidiary because the commission could question
the contractual price and require a company under investigation to
submit evidence to support the contractual price so long as the trans-
action was not at "arm's length..... The definition of an "arm's
length" transaction for Federal Power Commission purposes is yet to
be determined.
The Interstate case and the Phillips case extended federal regulation
to field sales by pipelines and independent producers. This does not
mean, however, that the question of arm's length bargaining has be-
come moot. An allowance claimed by a pipeline, gatherer, plant
operator, or producer for purchased gas which is resold in interstate
commerce is not infrequently questioned. If the sale is between af-
filiates or not at arm's length, the commission may refuse to allow
the natural gas company the cost of purchased gas unless the com-
pany presents evidence to support the reasonableness of the price
which it in fact paid and the seller received. One case held that a
producing company which is wholly owned by a regulated pipeline
company stands in the same position as an integrated producing arm
or department of the pipeline company, and the court required the
pipeline to substantiate prices charged by the affiliate with the type
of evidence required by the Colorado Interstate and City of Detroit
cases." 2 Therefore, when the commission finds that the sale is not at
220331 U.S. 682 (1947).
221 See Newcomb, Effects of Federal Regulation Under the Natural Gas Act Upon the
Production and Gathering of Natural Gas, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 217, 224 (1956).
... Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 252 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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arm's length and the commission has not previously established the
seller's rate at a just and reasonable level, the commission may require
the purchaser to justify the purchased gas expense by proving the
reasonableness of the seller's rates by the rate base method. Since the
commission would not have the authority to change the seller's rates,
the sole question in such a proceeding would be the determination of
the amount the purchaser is entitled to receive as an expense. In the
event that the purchaser does not dominate the seller to the extent
that he could force him to adjust the price and if there is no common
ownership, the question would be whether the disallowance of the
full contractual price would constitute confiscation of the purchaser's
property.23
b. Independent Producer Cases.-The commission has disposed of
several independent producer cases instituted under sections 4(e)
and 5 (a). However, a final decision by the commission has not been
issued in any case of consequence dealing with the principal problems
of producer rate regulation or prescribing the evidence required to
prove the justness and reasonableness of field prices. The Phillips in-
vestigation was dismissed in 1951, but it was reconvened in 1954
after the issuance of the Supreme Court's Phillips decision; the ex-
aminer has rendered his decision and this matter is presently before
the commission.
The opinions rendered by the commission in producer cases have
shed little light upon what is expected of a producer who must prove
that existing or increased rates are just and reasonable. However, the
commission has stated that producer rate cases will proceed on an
ad hoc basis, and the decisions indicate that producers will be re-
quired, except in certain undefined situations, to use the rate base
method to prove the reasonableness of existing and increased rates.
This position has been forced upon the commission by the judicial
decisions as a result of the Supreme Court's failure to make any
distinction between an independent producer and an integrated inter-
state transmission company. On several occasions the commission has
protested the use of the traditional rate base method to fix the field
price of natural gas produced by independent producers and trans-
mission companies, but the decisions have required the commission to
control field prices by the rate base method.
The burden rests upon the producer in a section 4 (e) proceeding
to prove the reasonableness of an increased rate. When the producer's
evidence does not support the reasonableness of the increased rate




and the commission is unable to determine the reasonable rate from
the evidence presented, the producer has not presented a prima facie
case, and the rate increase must be disallowed."4 The commission has
construed the Act to mean that the producer's evidence must be
"clear and convincing" or "affirmative, concrete and persuasive. '
The usual procedure followed in early section 4 (e) cases was for
the staff or an intervenor to make a motion to dismiss after the pre-
sentation of the producer's evidence and cross examination by the
staff. Most producer cases which have been concluded were dismissed
at this stage of the proceeding after a ruling by the examiner to the
effect that the producer did not present a prima facie case." 6 When
ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the commission has held that the
examiner must determine every presumption and inference reason-
ably to be drawn from the evidence in favor of the producer."' If the
producer presents a prima facie case, one case indicates that the com-
mission's staff should present a rebuttal case; however, it does not
hold that the producer is entitled to the increased rate if the staff fails
to make out its case.
In the Matter of Union Oil Co.2 11 illustrates the type
of evidence presented by independent producers in early section 4 (e)
cases. The second opinion rendered in the Union Oil case contains the
basic policy of the commission governing independent producer cases.
At the initial hearing Union Oil presented evidence showing that the
increased rates were the result of arm's length bargaining and such
rates were comparable to field prices existing in the area. Evidence
was introduced to prove the increased price of 17 per Mcf. reflected
the commodity value of Union Oil's production. Other evidence
showed that the purchasing pipeline company could sell such gas to
its customers at a price which would compete favorably with coal
and fuel oil purchased for space heating and similar uses. Further,
Union Oil presented evidence to prove that it granted additional con-
sideration to the purchaser, as the dedication of additional reserves, to
obtain the increased price. Although the commission held that Union
Oil's evidence did not establish the reasonableness of the increased
224 See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Memphis Natural Gas Co., 162 F.2d 388
(sth Cir. 1947); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 121 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1941); In
the Matter of H. F. Sears, 18 F.P.C. 244 (1957): In the Matter of Crow Drilling Co., 17
F.P.C. 226 (1956): In the Matter of Union Oil Co., 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956).
2.5 See In the Matter of Union Oil Co., supra note 224; In the Matter of Transcontinent-
al Gas Pipe Line Corp., 11 F.P.C. 94 (1952).
22. See authorities cited note 231 infra.
12 In the Matter of United Carbon Co., 19 F.P.C. 242 (1958); In the Matter of Union
Oil Co., supra note 224.
12 In the Matter of United Carbon Co., supra note 227.
229 16 F.P.C. 100, 17 F.P.C. 89, 17 F.P.C. 256 (1956).
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rates, the proceeding was not terminated, and the producer was given
another opportunity to present additional evidence. 3 ' At the second
hearing Union Oil continued its policy argument, contending that
the evidence presented at the first hearing was sufficient to prove the
reasonableness of the increased rates and that the public interest re-
quired the acceptance of field price evidence rather than cost of service
evidence.
The decision issued at the conclusion of the second hearing estab-
lished the pattern which was followed in succeeding producer cases.
Briefly stated, the Union Oil case ruled that the Natural Gas Act does
not permit the commission to approve increased rates when only evi-
dence of arm's length bargaining, field prices, and commodity or
market value is introduced and there is no cost evidence presented
which shows the increased rates are no higher than necessary to main-
tain the financial integrity of the producer and encourage exploration.
The decisions rendered to date indicate quite clearly that proof of
arm's length bargaining and evidence showing that the increased rate
is in line with prevailing field prices is insufficient to sustain the bur-
den of proof in the usual producer rate case.23' Moreover, additional
proof of workable competition in the field will not remove a case
from the above rule.23
In the Matter of United Carbon Co. &Y Columbian Fuel Corp."' in-
volved an increase from 22.50 to 260 per Mcf. for gas produced from
various fields in Kentucky. The increase, which resulted from price
redeterminations, amounted to approximately $200,000 annually
for each of the two producers. The producers' direct case did not in-
clude traditional rate base evidence, but cost studies were introduced
which reflected the estimated total cash expenditures necessary to
maintain deliveries and gas reserves during a period of five years
following the effective date of the price redetermination. United Car-
bon's cost of service ranged from 24.530 per Mcf. in 1956 to an esti-
mated cost of service in 1960 of 26.580 per Mcf. Columbian Fuel's
studies estimated the cost of service at 23.910 per Mcf. to 26.030 per
Mcf. during the same period. The examiner held that the producers'
evidence fell short of the standard required by the City of Detroit de-
cision and recommended dismissal pursuant to the staff's motion.
230 The case was not dismissed because it was one of the first producer rate cases.
.. In the Matter of Sun Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 973 (1958); In the Matter of H. L. Hunt,
supra note 223; In the Matter of Delhi-Taylor Oil Co., 18 F.P.C. 375 (1957): In the Matter
of Forest Oil Corp., 17 F.P.C. 586 (1957); In the Matter of H. F. Sears, supra note 224;
In the Matter of Crow Drilling Co., supra note 224; In the Matter of Crow Drilling Co.,
supra note 224: In the Matter of Sun Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 174 (1956).
... In the Matter of Associated Oil & Gas Co., 17 F.P.C. 199 (1956).
aa3 19 F.P.C. 242 (1958).
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On review, the commission reversed the examiner's decision and
remanded the proceeding to the examiner for the submission of addi-
tional evidence. With respect to that part of the examiner's decision
which held the producers' cost evidence was inadequate to discharge
the burden of proof required by the City of Detroit case, the com-
mission stated:
We believe that, under the present uncertain and peculiar situation
created by applicable court decisions, together with the obvious diffi-
culty of fixing just and reasonable rates for producers by allowing a
rate of return on a rate base, the applicants here have introduced suffi-
cient evidence of a persuasive nature to warrant our permitting this
case to proceed. The evidence above mentioned in this case distinguishes
it from the other producers' rate cases which we have dismissed. 4
The commission ordered the case remanded to the examiner to give
the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence or to dem-
onstrate why the rate base approach was not necessary, practical, or
appropriate in that particular case.
An exception to the Union Oil case was formulated and presented
in the West Edmond case.2"' Within the West Edmond Field there is
a unitized area consisting of 133 leases which are owned by eleven
producers. The 133 leases cover 754 tracts of land, and each tract has
a different percentage of participation in unitized substances. The
commission recognized that the rate base method would result in 133
widely varying prices for gas produced from the same field and
would require a study of the entire operations of each company, al-
though all of the companies' rates were not under review. The com-
mission concluded, therefore, that such an undertaking was not
feasible.
The commission stated that it was not disapproving the use of the
rate base method, which it said "must under the City of Detroit deci-
sion continue in a proper case to attempt to apply."'' 4 But the com-
mission allowed the producers the increased rates on the basis of evi-
dence similar to that presented in the Union Oil case and a token
showing of costs, without requiring the presentation of traditional
rate base evidence. The commission concluded that:
It [the facts of the instant case] demonstrates clearly the inappropriate-
ness of utilizing the rate base formula in fixing producer rates and that
use of such a formula produces incongruous results and in the long run
234 Id. at 244.
*" In the Matter of Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 19 F.P.C. 463 (1958).
236 Id. at 469.
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is detrimental to the interest of the consumers who need supplies of
natural gas on a long term basis. '
It is not clear at this date what factual situations will come within
the West Edmond exception to the Union Oil rule. In the Matter of
Continental Oil Co.3 s arose as a result of a rate increase in the Wood-
lawn Field, Harrison County, Texas. The Woodlawn Field is not
operated under a field-wide unitization agreement, but there are
numerous jointly owned production units comprising approximately
640 acres each. The producers entered into agreements with a third
party for the gathering and processing of their production and the
delivery of residue gas to two interstate transmission companies at
the tail gate of the plant. The producers entered into gas purchase
contracts with the transmission companies, and all of the contracts,
including the processing agreements, were apparently the result of
arm's length bargaining.
In the Continental case the commission refused to apply the prin-
ciples announced in the West Edmond opinion on several grounds;
viz., (1) that the record disclosed facts and circumstances differing
from those of the West Edmond case; (2) that general cost evidence
was presented in the West Edmond case and such evidence was com-
pletely lacking in the Continental case; and (3) that the commission
had not allowed other producers in the general area of the Woodlawn
Field rates higher than the increased rate.239 Thus the commission fol-
lowed the Union Oil case and required the producers to introduce cost
evidence to support the increased rate. Commissioners Digby and
Kline dissented, stating that they were unable to distinguish between
the two cases. The District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the
commission's order dismissing the proceeding for failure to present
cost evidence." ' The court did not discuss the relevance of the West
Edmond case, however.
The Union Oil case, styled Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC24' upon review,
was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit shortly after the release of the West Edmond opinion. The
Bel Oil case affirmed the commission's Union Oil decision and held
that field price or commodity value evidence was relevant to a pro-
237 Id. at 466.
231 19 F.P.C. 519, 19 F.P.C. 917 (1958). See also In the Matter of Sun Oil Co., supra
note 231.
"" The commission had allowed other producers in the area of the West Edmond field
rates higher than the increased rate.
249 Episcopal Theological Seminary of the Southwest v. FPC, 269 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.
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ducer rate proceeding, but such evidence alone is "not sufficient to
warrant a finding by the commission that a price comparable to
them is just and reasonable within the intentment of the Natural Gas
Act." 4 ' The court further held that additional testimony by expert
witnesses, which is introduced to prove the increased price is needed
to provide incentive for exploration and development, would not
suffice. The Bel Oil opinion did not define the facts which bring a
case within the exception created by West Edmond."3
Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC,'" a companion to the Bel Oil case, consid-
ered the producers' contention that the use of the rate base method
was too difficult and hence was not feasible. The West Edmond case
was cited by the producers to support the use of field price evidence.
The court stated that the commission has "much latitude" in its
selection of the applicable criteria and that the commission must ini-
tially decide what factors are necessary for a case to come within the
West Edmond rule; it was unwilling to extend the application of the
West Edmond decision. Subsequently, in Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC,4 5
the Fifth Circuit clarified its holding in the Gulf case in the follow-
ing language:
What we intended there [Gulf case] to make clear, and what we now
say, is: If the Commission finds that a rate is reasonable to the consum-
ing public it need not reject such rate as not being just and reasonable
merely because it will yield to a particular producer more than the
very minimum required by constitutional standards or more by way of
net yield than is returned to another producer in the same well or field,
especially if such result follows from a considered decision by the Com-
mission that a uniform price for all the producers of a single well or
a single field is not only reasonable but is also highly desirable for con-
venience of administration. This is what the Commission did in order
No. 310, [West Edmond] supra.'"e
However, it is submitted that the commission will confine the ap-
plication of the West Edmond rule to cases which involve field-wide
unitization programs and similar factual situations, e.g., plant sales
where the use of the rate base method would be impractical due to
the number of parties, allocations, rate bases, and costs of service in-
volved. Since the courts have not as yet sustained the validity of the
West Edmond rule, it is apparent that the commission is hesitant to
extend it.
.4255 F.2d at 553.
243 The court questioned the validity of some of the distinctions drawn by the commission
in the West Edmond case, but indirectly approved the commission's decision.
244255 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1958).
2'5263 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1959). See Sears v. FPC, 263 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1959).
46 263 F.2d at 625-26.
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The proceedings before the commission indicate that the rate base
approach may be feasible when the commission is considering a large
producing company and the record covers the entire operations of the
company. But the producer's operations must be broad enough to
give sufficient economic data to reflect a meaningful result or average.
At least one commissioner has publicly recognized that, with respect
to small producers, the type of cost evidence introduced in current
cases does little to aid the commission in determining just and reason-
able rates since the use of economic data pertaining to a few isolated
sales may reflect a rate which is either exorbitantly high or ridicu-
lously low. Consequently, it is apparent that the commission may be
forced to depart from the traditional method to reach a reasonable
result. The Fifth Circuit, in its Forest Oil247 decision, apparently at-
tempted to pave the way for this departure.
We do not think that either the Commission or the petitioner should
be baffled or handicapped in this new field of regulation by any formulas
by whatever name they are known. Specifically, if there is an account-
ing or rate-making formula known to the public utilities industry as
a "conventional rate-base method of rate-making" which the Commis-
sion in its order of dismissal in this case said must be used at least as
a basis of comparison or point of departure, we say the Commission need
not require it unless such method is the only way by which the Com-
mission can make its required determination. This is what we undertook
to say in the Bel Oil opinion, and it is clear that the Commission
recognizes that it is free to act thus by such of its opinions as 310,
[West Edmond] supra.""
Nevertheless, the commission has not formulated or announced the
adoption of any method of general application in lieu of the tradi-
tional method.
The decisions rendered by the commission and the courts thus in-
dicate that independent producers will be generally required to prove
that the increased rates which they seek are "just and reasonable" by
the traditional method; producers may substantiate increased rates
by means other than the traditional method when such method is
not feasible or its use casts an undue burden on the parties and the
commission. The traditional rate base method must be adapted to the
producing industry in the usual case; however, authoritative state-
ments have not been issued by the commission regarding the man-
ner in which the method will be used, and there has been little in-
dication as to the accounting principles and theories which will be
controlling.
247 Supra note 245.
248 263 F.2d at 626.
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The commission allowed increased rates in In the Matter of Wun-
derlick Dev. Co.,24 In the Matter of Christie, Mitchell &4 Mitchell,250
In the Matter of Davidor & Davidor,5'1 In the Matter of Harper Oil
Co.,25 2 and In the Matter of Negley d/b/a Paisano Trading Co.,25'
but it did not state the factors which it regarded as justifying the
increases. These cases are probably useless as authority (except pos-
sibly for the Davidor & Davidor case) but they may have some
comparative value.
In the Davidor & Davidor case evidence was introduced which in-
dicated that revenue received from the sale of exhausted gas reserves,
revenue to be realized from the sale of the remaining gas reserves at
the increased price, and an additional sum for distillate sold and to
be sold would amount to $161,450 during the life of the wells.
Operating expense, computed during a twelve month test period,
and the total investment, less salvage, was calculated at $128,998.
This figure did not include the cost of a dry hole, preliminary ex-
ploration expenses, income taxes, and lease acquisition costs. The pro-
ducer's evidence showed that the working interest would net $32,452
over the life of the wells. The commission stated that it did not place
great reliance upon the producer's cost study or upon the fact that
a rate of return of nine per cent would produce a price close to the
increased rate, but the commission allowed the increase on the basis
of this "dollar-in-dollar-out" and "net cash realization" presentation.
When the commission's Union Oil decision was affirmed, numer-
ous producer rate cases were set for hearing, and in the summer of
1958, producers began to introduce comprehensive cost studies. Since
that time, the commission has disposed of several producer rate cases.
In the Matter of Hassie Hunt Trust"4 and In the Matter of Rebstocz
& Reeves Drilling Co.2 "5 are section 4 (e) cases which were settled
without full hearings and which allowed the producers the increased
rates. In the Hassie Hunt Trust case the commission's staff introduced
a cost of service study solely for the purpose of settlement and
moved to terminate the proceeding on the ground that the increased
rates were within the zone of reasonableness and had not been shown
to be unjust or unreasonable. The commission terminated the pro-
ceedings and allowed the increased rates. In the Rebstock. & Reeves
24 15 F.P.C. 690, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1090 (1956).
25115 F.P.C. 751, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 385 (1956).
251 15 F.P.C. 1236, 5 Oil & Gas Rep. 1081 (1956).
25217 F.P.C. 803 (1957).
253 17 F.P.C. 550, 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 521 (1957).
254 21 F.P.C. 27 (1959).
255
-F.P.C.. (1959), issued April 20, 1959, Docket No. G-9721.
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case the staff verified the accuracy of the producer's cost exhibit
and moved to place the study in evidence as justification for ter-
minating the proceeding. In the Matter of Bayview Oil Corp. " is a
section 4(e) case that was terminated upon motion by staff counsel.
Both the producer and the staff introduced cost evidence. One exhibit
was introduced for the limited purpose of supporting the staff's
motion; it showed that the total cost of service exceeded the pro-
ducer's revenues.
In the Matter of the Altex Corp., 7 In the Matter of Gillring Oil
Co.,258 and In the Matter of Ralph E. Fair & Ralph E. Fair, Inc. 5 are
section 5 (a) investigations which have been dismissed. In each of
these cases, the rates of the party under investigation were either low-
er than, or in line with, the rates determined by the staff's cost of
service studies; thus, the motions to dismiss were granted solely on the
basis of the staff's studies. The orders of the commission do not
comment on the merits of the cases, but the examiners' decisions may
have some comparative value.
Few producers have succeeded before the commission in obtaining
increases, but several producers have been successful in having sus-
pension orders rescinded before hearings were convened. " ' These pro-
ducers submitted cost of service studies in support of the increased
rates, and the commission set aside the orders suspending these rates
and terminated the section 4(e) proceedings. Percentage-wise, pro-
ducers who have used this procedure have been more successful than
producers who have presented evidence at the usual hearing. Several
producers, whose filings for favored-nation increases had been sus-
pended, requested the commission to rescind the favored-nation filing
and suspension order and to accept a superseding periodic escalation
filing (for a lesser rate) without suspension. Recently, the commis-
sion allowed filings of this type for lesser rates where they were sup-
ported by field price evidence and where the producer agreed to fore-
go certain contractual rights to obtain the rate free from any obliga-
tion to refund. These latter orders were issued without requiring cost
data to support the rate which was allowed.
8
-- F.P.C. (1959), issued March 27, 1959, Docket No. G-9417.
21720 F.P.C. 716 (1958).
258 20 F.P.C. 770 (1958).
"920 F.P.C. 810 (1958).




IV. CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
AND NECESSITY
Section 7 (e) of the act provides that the commission "shall have
the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the ex-
ercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and
conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require." '
There are no decisions defining the sort of conditions which the com-
mission may insert in an independent producer's certificate, and it may
be decided that the commission may impose any reasonable condition
found to be necessary to protect the public interest. However, section
7(e) is most frequently used in producer certificate cases in an at-
tempt to reduce the initial rate; the commission authorizes the sale
subject to the condition that the initial rate be reduced to a certain
level. This area of federal regulation is in a state of flux as a result
of the Supreme Court's CATCO decision, 6 ' which was issued June
22, 1959. The commission has not yet issued an opinion interpreting
the CATCO decision or resolving the conflicts between the CATCO
case and its previous decisions; therefore, these decisions must be
reviewed before the impact of the CATCO case may be understood
or any conclusions may be drawn.6
Several factors have caused purchasers and consumer interests to
urge the commission to insert rate conditions in producer certificates.
Section 4(e) of the act does not authorize the suspension of initial
rates; therefore, a time consuming company-wide investigation under
section 5 (a) must be instituted and concluded before an initial rate
may be modified. Further, the going price for new gas reserves has
been steadily rising in most areas since the Phillips case. Federal regu-
lation has caused producers to seek intrastate markets; for this rea-
son, and since section 4 of the act has partially defeated the effective-
ness of escalation clauses, interstate transmission companies have been
forced to pay a premium price to obtain gas to be introduced into
interstate commerce." ' To prevent producers from taking advantage
of the present sellers' market, consumer interests have frequently
advocated the issuance of producer certificates conditioned under sec-
tion 7(e) on a "just and reasonable" rate.
Prior to the Phillips case administrative precedent and judicial
sanction existed which permitted the commission to consider the im-
"'If5 U.S.C.A. § 717f.(e) (1948).
.. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
263 Since the date of this writing, the commission issued its Transwestern decision, Opinion
No. 328, issued August 10, 1959, as modified on September 23, 1959.
264 Federal regulation has mitigated the pipelines' fear of triggering favored nations
clauses by paying higher prices.
1959]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
pact of pipeline rates upon consumers and, when such action was
found necessary to protect the ultimate consumer, to impose rate
conditions in pipeline certificates. In the Matter of Cities Services
Gas Co. d Signal Oil FJ Gas Co.6' was the first producer case in which
the commission invoked its power under section 7 (e) and conditioned
a permanent producer certificate. In the Signal case the commission's
staff introduced considerable evidence indicating that 10 per Mcf.
was the prevailing price in the area and that the initial price of 120
per Mcf. provided by the gas sales contract would trigger numerous
favored-nation clauses if it were allowed. The commission condi-
tioned the producer's certificate to the 10 rate; this action was based
on findings that the rate proposed by the producer would cause eco-
nomic disruption in a large area and that the producer's sale at the
proposed rate was not in the public interest. The commission's order
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for The Third
Circuit. 6
The commission has conditioned a number of temporary authori-
zations, but the validity of this policy has not been litigated. Section
7(e) authorizes the commisson to condition "the certificate and . . .
the exercise of the rights granted thereunder" and does not expressly
grant the commission authority to condition a "temporary certifi-
cate." Moreover, the commission is only authorized to attach to the
issuance of certificates "such reasonable terms and conditions as the
public convenience and necessity may require." The determination
of reasonable terms and conditions required by the public conveni-
ence and necessity clearly contemplates a hearing and findings based
on substantial evidence, but section 7(c) authorizes the issuance of
temporary certificates "without notice or hearing." Consequently,
the courts may find that the commission was not granted the power
to condition temporary authorizations." 7
With two exceptions, the commission has consistently held that
it is not in the public interest to determine the reasonableness of in-
dependent producers' rates in certificate proceedings, and it has relied
upon its authorty to test the producers' rates subsequently in proceed-
ings instituted under sections 4 and 5 of the act."6 8 The majority of
26515 F.P.C. 147, 5 Oil & Gas Rep. 625 (1956).
266 Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1956).
..7 Since the date of this writing, the Tenth Circuit issued its decision in Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959), which held that the commission
has the authority to condition a temporary authorization.
2.. in the Matter of Columbian Fuel Corp., 19 F.P.C. 479 (1958); In the Matter of
Hope Natural Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 405 (1958); In the Matter of Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C.
416 (1958); In the Matter of Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 618 (1958); In
the Matter of Superior Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 637 (1958); In the Matter of Lexia Buchanan,
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the commission has recognized that the adoption of a contrary policy
would cast an undue burden on independent producers and an ad-
ministrative burden upon the agency. Since the rate base method is
the only method which the courts have sanctioned as a means of
determining a just and reasonable rate, several years would probably
elapse before the hearings could be concluded and the certificate is-
sued. Extended proceedings would needlessly force producers to pay
shut-in royalties to maintain leases while the proceedings were pend-
ing, cause waste by the flaring of casinghead gas and, in certain cases,
require producers to pay additional sums to prevent leases, which
are capable of production, from lapsing.
The Seaboard case.. 9 illustrates the commission's position prior to
the CATCO decision. In the Signal case considerable evidence had
been presented showing that prices in the area were lower than the
initial rate and that the initial rate would adversely affect the staits
quo of the existing rate structure due to favored-nation clauses. In
its Seaboard opinion the commission limited the application of the
Signal holding to cases presenting substantially similar fact situations.
Further, the commission stated that even in an appropriate case there
must be some rational basis for substituting a particular "conditioned
rate" for the price proposed by the parties to the gas sales contract.
The opinion recites that the method of determining the conditioned
price "must have some real or substantive relation to the object
sought to be obtained" and that some standard of reasonableness must
be formulated before the use of rate conditions will be workable. The
commission further stated that the primary means for the protection
of the consumer against excessive rates is afforded by the rate pro-
visions of the act.
The dissenting opinion of Commissioner Connole states that the
commission must consider the initial price and the effect of such
price in its public convenience and necessity determination. His opin-
ion advocates the use of rate conditions to control initial prices, and
attempts to formulate a method which could be used to test pro-
ducer prices in certificate cases. The dissent prescribes a system by
which the "going price" or the average price negotiated in a given
area over a given period of time is determined and advocates the use
of this data to test initial rates. The commissioner states that the
producer and other parties could introduce other evidence of a
order issued July 1, 1955, Docket No. G-3864, 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 1431; In the Matter of
Lenor M. Josey, Inc., order issued September 13, 1955, Docket No. G-8709; In the Matter
of Albert Plummer, order issued September 29, 1955, Docket No. G-2578.
'"In the Matter of Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416 (1958). The Seaboard decision
was recently afrmed in United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, - .2d (3rd Cir. 1959).
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general nature to substantiate a price higher or lower than the going
price. However, this "going" field price method is synonymous with
the fair field price, weighted average price, and commodity value
methods which the City of Detroit case and the Bel Oil case rejected
as a means of proving the reasonableness of producer rates in rate
proceedings. If producers are not allowed to use these methods in a
rate proceeding to substantiate rates, it is believed that the commis-
sion should not use them to strike down initial prices in a certificate
proceeding.
In the Seaboard case the examiner held that, while the burden of
proving all elements in a certificate case is on the producer-applicant,
the injection of the rate condition issue shifts the burden of proof to
the party raising the issue. Hence, the proponent of the rate condi-
tion must assume the burden of proving that the attachment of the
condition is required by the public interest. The commission affirmed
the examiner's ruling. Another decision elaborates further:
We are of the view that if the applicant proves there is a market for
the gas at the proposed price and that the project is economically fea-
sible at the proposed price .. . it has sustained its burden of going
forward with the evidence, and in the absence of evidence showing that
the proposed price or rate adversely affects the public convenience and
necessity, the applicant has made out a prima facie case, and a certi-
ficate should issue to it." °
In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FPC27 ' an interstate transmission
company and several producers filed certificate applications with the
commission requesting authorization for the sales by the producers to
the pipeline and the construction and operation of the necessary
facilities. Oklahoma Natural, a wholly intrastate company, was
among the many intervenors. The intervenors opposed the issuance
of the certificates and, in the alternative, requested that the certifi-
cates be conditioned at a price which was claimed to be the prevail-
ing price in the area. The commission, however, found that the pro-
posed sales were required by the public interest and that the factual
situation could be distinguished from that of the Signal case. Thus,
the producers' certificates were issued without rate conditions. Okla-
homa Natural petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit for review.
.70 In the Matter of Hope Natural Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 405, 407 (1958).
271 257 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See Florida Economic Advisory Council v. FPC,
251 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957), wherein the court stated: " . . . this inquiry may be re-
solved in a rate proceeding rather than in a proceeding for a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, and the Commission did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the
matter in the instant proceeding. The rates are subject to the Commission's continuing juris-
diction, and, whenever sufficient reason appears, they may be taken up." 251 F.2d at 646.
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Oklahoma Natural contended that the commission erred by grant-
ing the producers' certificates without rate conditions upon the fol-
lowing grounds: (1) the initial rate exceeded the prevailing price in
the area; (2) the prohibition against sales that are not just and rea-
sonable is all-inclusive and applicable to any and all sales; (3) the
provisions of section 4(a) are applicable to certificate proceedings;
(4) section 4(a) imposes a mandatory duty upon the commission
to insure that the initial rate is just and reasonable when a party to
the proceeding raises a substantial question as to its reasonableness;
(5) the commission did not enter express findings to support the
reasonableness of the initial rate; and (6) the commission's findings
were not supported by the record. The court rejected each of Okla-
homa Natural's contentions and dismissed the petition."7
In the Trunkline case..3 the commission issued certificates permit-
ting sales at a rate above the area level, fully realizing that such rates
would activate favored nation clauses in other contracts. The commis-
sion stated that the fact that the proposed rate is required by the pub-
lic convenience and necessity must be established by substantial proof;
it found that the record contained the requisite proof. The commis-
sion reviewed the prices in the area and found that the proposed rate
was one-half cent per Mcf. above what it considered to be the going
price. Had price alone been considered, the commission would have
conditioned the certificate, thereby requiring a rate reduction of one-
half cent per Mcf., but it held that the sales were required by the pub-
lic convenience and necessity at the proposed rate due to the large vol-
umes to be sold, the absence of escalations during the first ten years of
the contractual term, and the fact that the pipeline could not purchase
such gas for a lesser price. The commission recognized that "consider-
able weight must be given to initial contracts which have been freely
negotiated between willing sellers and buyers in a competitive mar-
272 In support of the decision, the court stated:
The statute makes the issuance of a certificate dependent upon a finding of 'public
convenience and necessity,' and it delegates to the Commission the power and duty
to make that finding. The Commission, by its expert knowledge of and continuing
contact with the natural gas industry, is qualified to make the determinations of fact
and the evaluations of policy which the issuance of a certificate requires. . . .The
granting or denial of a certificate of public convenience and necessity is a matter
peculiarly within the discretion of the Commission. . . . 'Just as the Commission has
authority to impose conditions upon the issuance of a certificate so, too, it has au-
thority to refuse to impose conditions. . . .' Section 4(a) states the substantive ob-
jective of the Act, that rates be reasonable; it does not specify the procedure by
which this objective is to be attained. That procedure is prescribed by 5§ 4(d),
4(e) and 5(a). The Commission cannot be required to convert every certificate
proceeding into a rate proceeding.
... In the Matter of Trunkline Gas Company, F.P.C.- (1959), Opinion No. 321,
issued May 22, 1959, Docket No. G-15394.
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ket, and which may well reflect the value of the gas in the particular
market and under the circumstances of the particular transaction
more accurately than any other evidence which may be adduced."
This was the status of the cases prior to the Supreme Court's
CATCO decision. In the CATCO case, the gas sales contracts pro-
vided an initial price of 22.40 per Mcf. for natural gas produced off-
shore. The examiner recommended the issuance of certificates con-
ditioned to a rate of 18¢ per Mcf. The commission concurred with
the examiner's decision, and the certificates were conditioned accord-
ingly; however, the order permitted the producers to file notices of
change to place the 22.40 rate into effect one day after the date of
initial deliveries. Thus, the producers would receive that portion of
the price which exceeded 180 per Mcf. subject to refund. The pro-
ducers refused to accept the conditional certificates and, on rehear-
ing, the commission issued permanent certificates without rate con-
ditions after finding the pipeline's reserve requirements outweighed
the objectionable price.'
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit construed the producers' certificate applications as limitations on
the commission's power to consider whether the initial rate was in
the public interest. The court held that Congress had not given the
commission the power to inquire into the issue of public convenience
and necessity when the producer circumscribes the scope of the in-
quiry and that the commission cannot conduct a limited inquiry in a
certificate proceeding or consider an application which requires the
commission to forego the consideration of a factor that may be an
essential element in the formulation of its judgment. Also, the court
stated that producers must be willing to perform the proposed serv-
ices and conform to the provisions of the act, that the producers'
action indicated they were not willing to comply with the latter re-
quirement, and that "this itself would require the denial of the appli-
cations.'
The Supreme Court, in Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n," affirmed the Third Circuit's decision but repudiated the
portion of the decision discussed above. The Court held that the filing
of a certificate application is, in essence, a proposal and does not con-
stitute a dedication to interstate markets; thus the producers were at
liberty to reject the certificates and cancel the contracts.
The Supreme Court recognized that the act does not require the
274 In the Matter of Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 732, 17 F.P.C. 880 (1957).
.. Public Service Commission v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3rd Cir. 1959).
270 Supra note 262.
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commission to determine a just and reasonable rate in a certificate
proceeding and that such determination is not prerequisite to the is-
suance of a certificate. Moreover, the court reaffirmed its decision in
the Mobile case277 which held that rates are established initially by
contract, that initial rates may only be modified at the conclusion of
a section 5 (a) proceeding, that initial rates are not subject to suspen-
sion, and, in effect, that natural gas companies are entitled to the ini-
tial rate during the time the section 5 (a) proceeding is pending. But
the Court held that the element of price is of prime importance in the
public convenience and necessity determination and that the com-
mission has a duty to guard the public interest between the date of
initial deliveries and the date a section 5 (a) proceeding is concluded.
Thus, when the initial price is contrary to the public interest, the
commission must either deny the application or condition the certi-
ficate in such manner as to protect the consuming public.
The opinion states that it was the purpose and intention of Con-
gress to create a single, comprehensive, and effective regulatory
scheme under which all rates are subject to modification by the com-
mission "to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective
bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." The Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to deny the consuming public
protection between the date of initial deliveries and the conclusion of
the section 5 (a) proceedings, or to give the natural gas company the
windfall gain resulting from the long delay. Congress' comprehen-
sive "regulatory scheme" was interpreted to include the power to
condition certificates under section 7(e) to provide the consuming
public with complete protection from exploitation by natural gas
companies.
The Court stated that the exercise of this power under section
7(e) is not an encroachment upon the Mobile doctrine, ". . . but
merely the exercise of that duty imposed upon the Commission to
protect the public interest in determining whether the issuance of
the certificate is required by the public convenience and neces-
sity. . . ." Also, the opinion states that the commission does not deter-
mine the reasonableness of the initial rates or set aside the price agreed
upon by the parties, but it ". . . so conditions the certificate that the
consuming public may be protected while the justness and reason-
ableness of the price fixed by the parties is being determined under
other sections of the Act." The provisions of section 7 (e) are there-
277 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
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fore invoked "to hold the line awaiting adjudication of a just and
reasonable rate."
This decision places the burden of proof on the producer to show
that the initial price is required by the public convenience and
necessity, and, in the absence of such showing, it requires the com-
mission to deny the application or to condition the certificate to pro-
tect the consumer interest. If the producer fails to make the neces-
sary showing "prerequisite to the issuance of the permanent certi-
ficate" and the commission imposes a rate condition, the producer
has effectively been denied the right to establish the rate initially,
and it is the writer's opinion that the Mobile doctrine has been
modified to this extent.
It is not clear at this date what type of evidence which must be
introduced by the producer to sustain the burden of proving that
the initial rate is required by the public convenience and necessity.
In several contested certificate cases the commission has requested or
required the producers to supplement their certificate applications
with the following information: (a) the current level of prices being
paid by the purchaser in the area; (b) the current level of prices
being paid by the purchaser under other contracts containing terms
and provisions generally comparable to those under consideration;
(c) data comparing the contract with contracts covering the sales
described in (a) and (b) above with respect to quality and condi-
tions of delivery; (d) the effect of the proposed price upon the prices
paid by the purchaser under other contracts; and (e) any cost in-
formation which the producer or the purchaser may desire to sub-
mit, together with statements setting forth the reasons for the vari-
ance between the initial price and those currently being paid by the
purchaser in the area. If the initial rate is not higher than one or
more other rates in the area and will not activate favored-nation
clauses, the commission will probably require non-cost evidence
similar to that described in items (a) through (d) above. In the
event the initial rate will adversely affect other rates in the area, the
producer will probably be required to present cost evidence to avoid
a rate condition.7
The commission has imposed rate conditions in two instances; in
the Signal case the rate was conditioned to a specific level with no
provision of the issuing order authorizing a change in rate, but in
the CATCO case the producers were permitted to file a notice of
27s The CATCO decision infers that the producer should have introduced evidence show-
ing the difference in costs between the CATCO gas and other offshore gas in order to justify
the higher price for the former sale.
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change and collect the difference between the contractual price and
conditioned rate subject to refund. Under the Signal condition,
the producer's only remedy would be to petition the commission
alleging that prices in the area have been increased and to request
that the commission modify the rate condition and allow an increase
in rate. On the other hand, the CATCO condition permits the pro-
ducer to receive the questionable portion of the contract price, sub-
ject to refund, and to attempt to justify the entire rate in subsequent
proceedings. Also, the effective date upon which the producer re-
ceives the entire contractual price is delayed substantially by the
Signal type of condition if it is subsequently found to be just and
reasonable. The type of condition which the commission will impose
in future cases is unknown at this date, but it would appear that the
CATCO type of condition would be more logical since the Supreme
Court, in its CATCO decision, was striving to hold initial rates at
the just and reasonable level. However, the commission may eventu-
ally formulate some method of testing the reasonableness of initial
rates in certificate proceedings which is much simpler and less time
consuming than the method employed in rate cases today, thereby
permitting the commission to make its rate determination and es-
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